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SERVICES AND LAW ENFORCEMENT

RYAN CHARLES MCEVOY†
At the intersection of family and criminal law, the logic of parallel enforcement
enables the state, in the form of child protective services and law enforcement, to
investigate and seek sanctions for the same underlying conduct in family court and
the criminal justice system, respectively. But while that abstract rationale justifies the
dual-enforcement regime, there is a diﬀerent reality on the ground, where the systems
frequently borrow from each other, collectively strengthening them. In the context of
poverty-related neglect cases, this level of state intervention is often misplaced. At the
same time, the government may find its hands tied in far more serious cases of child
abuse, in which the nonoﬀending caregiver may exercise a veto over the prosecution
by refusing to cooperate. This Comment rejects certain stereotypes about these
caregivers—often mothers—and instead identifies the understandable lack of clarity
with respect to the family and criminal systems as a barrier to justice. The Comment
uses New York law and procedure as a case study for exploring and disentangling the
two systems. First, it proposes reducing the use of criminal sanctions in the neglect
context. Second, it suggests the use of formal agreements that clarify the roles of the
child protective and criminal systems as a way to gain the cooperation of nonoﬀending
caregivers in the criminal prosecution of child abuse. Finally, it demonstrates how
these proposals comply with existing law and may be scaled up across the United
States. By rebalancing the enforcement dynamic, the state can more eﬀectively protect
child welfare and support family unity.
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INTRODUCTION
For decades, something has been amiss in the way in which Child
Protective Services (CPS) and law enforcement in New York pursue cases of
child abuse and neglect. A working parent makes a bad judgment call, such
as leaving a child home alone for a few minutes while going to buy groceries,
and in the next moment, is under arrest for Endangering the Welfare of a
Child.1 Regardless of the outcome of the criminal case, CPS will launch an
investigation of the parent, which could eventually result in the removal of
the child from the home—all because of a temporary lapse in judgement.
1 These facts are adapted from an example described in People v. Cenat, 671 N.Y.S.2d 578, 579
(N.Y.C. Crim. Ct., Kings Cnty. 1997).

2021]

The Parent Trap

869

Meanwhile, in a diﬀerent but more serious case of child abuse, the
outcome could be much diﬀerent. For example, if a mother’s boyfriend
physically abused the child, CPS would lack jurisdiction over the case. If the
district attorney brings a criminal case against him, the child’s testimony
would be critical. But the mother may refuse to cooperate with law
enforcement because she is a survivor of domestic violence and fears
retaliation, or because she is worried about additional interaction with CPS.
Because of the mother’s uncooperativeness, the criminal case against the
physical abuser will fail either pursuant to the speedy trial statute,2 or because
the prosecutor lacks suﬃcient evidence to obtain a plea or go to trial.
This pair of hypothetical examples encapsulates the two major avenues
through which New York pursues perpetrators of child abuse and neglect. The
ﬁrst is a civil system consisting of CPS and family court; the second is the
criminal system comprised of police, prosecutors, and the criminal court. The
systems are formally separate, allowing for the state to pursue sanctions in
either or both, depending on the case.
But in reality, the civil and criminal systems frequently work together to
share resources and even legal findings. This cooperation allows the state to
pursue penalties in low-level child neglect cases, which are normally a byproduct
of the parent’s poverty. That cooperation is more limited in serious cases
involving, for example, physical abuse, in which the police and district attorney’s
office must rely on the cooperation of the child’s caregiver, or resort to coercive
methods which will potentially separate the caregiver from the child, to make
out their case. Because of this dynamic, the criminal case is at risk of falling apart
early on. Correcting this confusing paradox—in which the government
aggressively pursues neglect cases but lacks that same capacity in serious cases—
requires reconsidering the appropriate roles of each system and communicating
those distinctions to the communities those systems monitor and police.
In this Comment, I use New York as a case study to explore the interaction
between CPS and law enforcement. I suggest that the framework of parallel
enforcement represents a new way of thinking about the interaction of the two,
describe how the application of that framework raises concerns about New York’s
pursuit of child abuse and neglect cases, and offer two concrete solutions toward
solving the enforcement dilemma.3 In Part I, I describe the different ways in
which New York CPS and law enforcement approach the problems of child
See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.30 (McKinney 2020).
While I touch upon several important issues such as the use of foster care, the effectiveness of
different CPS and law enforcement interventions, and the role of race in the child welfare system, a
full exploration and evaluation of these topics, which have received extensive scholarly attention, is
beyond the scope of this work. See, e.g., INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, NEW DIRECTIONS
IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT RESEARCH 354 (Anne C. Petersen, Joshua Joseph & Monica Feit
eds., 2014) (stressing the need for additional research in the areas of race and socioeconomic status).
2
3
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abuse and neglect, as well as how the two systems are both required to and freely
choose to interact with one another. I explicitly frame this issue as one of parallel
enforcement—or the state’s investigation and enforcement of the same
underlying conduct in two different legal domains—and use this framework to
illustrate the points of convergence and divergence between the systems. I then
map the development of a typical CPS case, highlighting how this area of family
law is a hybrid of state and federal law, and contrast CPS investigations and
family court practice with law enforcement’s approach. Despite the two systems’
efforts to work together, different philosophical, institutional, and operational
practices often lead to system clash, potentially jeopardizing each process.
In Part II, I examine an imbalance in the way that the state pursues cases
of child abuse and neglect, identifying situations of both overenforcement and
underenforcement of the law. Overenforcement is visible in how the state
aggressively pursues low-level cases of child neglect, which are often triggered
by the caregiver’s poverty. Employing the rationale of parallel enforcement,
the state activates both the child welfare system and law enforcement to obtain
compounding sanctions for caregivers. Together, these processes may result in
both child removal pursuant to a civil order and a criminal conviction for
Endangering the Welfare of a Child. I show that the reliance on the logic of
parallel enforcement is selective, providing the government with an abstract
justification for pursuing two cases in different forums while simultaneously
breaking down the theoretical separation between the two in day-to-day
practice. The result is that both systems become more coercive. Drawing on
sociological scholarship, I critique this crossover for weakening trust between
the state and communities and ultimately harming children’s well-being. I
contend that clarity can be provided by shifting most of these cases to family
court, which is better prepared to order the preventative services favored by
recent developments in federal law.
I then turn to underenforcement, where I argue that while the state
appears anxious to pursue low-level neglect cases, it does not handle cases of
serious child abuse with the appropriate level of care. These cases, which
often involve the caregiver’s partner, are deeply challenging, as they are
largely outside of the reach of CPS and diﬃcult to successfully prosecute in
criminal court. Here, I introduce the problem of the uncooperative caregiver,
who may refuse to cooperate in law enforcement’s investigation of the crime
against the child. I suggest that contrary to certain stereotypes about mothers
in particular, a lack of cooperation may be attributable to a sloppy system of
parallel enforcement that fails, in theory and in practice, to communicate
clearly with parents about the risks, or lack thereof, of supporting the district
attorney’s child abuse investigation. In order to disentangle parallel
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enforcement in this area, I oﬀer a modest proposal to provide the caregiver
with certainty about the roles of the two systems.
In Part III, I conclude by demonstrating that these dual proposals—shifting
neglect cases to family court and more aggressively pursuing serious abuse
cases—would conform to both the letter and the spirit of state and federal law.
While I primarily focus on New York, I refer to other jurisdictions to highlight
common problems and areas for improvement. Because of the similarity of
enforcement structures and systemic problems, I contend that the solution
proposed here could be replicated in other U.S. jurisdictions.
I. BACKGROUND
CPS and law enforcement frequently work together either pursuant to a
statute or because of a common interest in sharing responsibilities in child
abuse and neglect cases. This includes investigating and sanctioning the same
conduct in the civil and criminal systems, in a process known as parallel
enforcement. The frame of parallel enforcement reveals points of
convergence and divergence in a dual-enforcement regime. Indeed, operating
under a parallel enforcement framework rarely results in seamless
cooperation between the two agencies. As a result of diﬀerent philosophical
approaches and operational objectives, these agencies may come into conﬂict
and interfere with each other’s investigations. Nevertheless, recent attempts
to deconﬂict the agencies’ work—such as through the use of Child Advocacy
Centers—has concretized a close relationship between them.
A. The Criminal Justice–Child Welfare Nexus
The criminal justice and child welfare systems have distinct roles in
preventing and responding to child abuse and neglect.4 In New York, the
purpose of the CPS5 system is to protect children by investigating reports of
abuse and neglect and to “provid[e] protection for the child . . . from further
abuse or maltreatment and rehabilitative services for the child or children and
parents involved.”6 CPS has jurisdiction only over matters involving parents
and other persons legally responsible (PLRs) for the child.7 While both
4 See DAVID I. SHEPPARD & PATRICIA ZANGRILLO, IMPROVING JOINT INVESTIGATIONS OF
CHILD ABUSE 3 (1996) (stating that the two systems investigate allegations of child abuse, but that
the use of that information “diﬀers according to their respective missions”).
5 In New York City, the CPS agency is the Administration for Children’s Services (ACS). See Child
Protective Proceedings (Abused or Neglected Children), N.Y. STATE UNIFIED CT. SYS., http://ww2.nycourts.
gov/COURTS/nyc/family/faqs_abusedchildren.shtml [https://perma.cc/VXL9-UXZH].
6 N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 411 (McKinney 2020).
7 See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1012(e)–(f) (McKinney 2020) (deﬁning “abused child” and
“neglected child” as involving parents or PLRs); see also N.Y. STATE OFF. OF CHILD. & FAM.
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federal and state law govern the administration of child welfare services, child
welfare is fundamentally a state issue,8 and New York belongs to a minority
of states that administer these services at the county level.9 Fundamentally,
CPS cases are civil proceedings within the domain of the local family court.10
In contrast, law enforcement—whose primary actors are the police and
district attorneys—only becomes involved when the suspected child abuse or
neglect is believed to rise to the level of criminal activity, and especially in
cases of abuse occurring outside of the family.11 Crimes against children are
some of the most diﬃcult to investigate and prosecute in part because
children are considered “perfect victims” with a limited ability to protect and
advocate for themselves.12 As such, police oﬃcers and prosecutors responsible
for child abuse and neglect cases often belong to specialized divisions or
bureaus that focus on sensitive types of cases.13
SERVS., SUMMARY GUIDE FOR MANDATED REPORTERS IN NEW YORK STATE 3 (2019) (stating
that if a report of child abuse or neglect does not allege a parent or PLR is the perpetrator, then
“[t]his is not a CPS report, and local CPS will not be involved”).
8 See CHILD.’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., Federal and State Laws and
Regulations, https://www.childwelfare.gov/topics/management/administration/requirements/laws [https://
perma.cc/JSH5-YAU6] (“Federal laws and regulations provide overarching standards and guidelines
for . . . child welfare . . . but each State has its own laws and regulations for child welfare matters.”).
9 CHILD.’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., STATE VS. COUNTY
ADMINISTRATION OF CHILD WELFARE SERVICES 1-2 (2018) (noting the contrast to systems
administered at the state level).
10 See N.Y. STATE OFF. OF CHILD. & FAM. SERVS., A GUIDE TO NEW YORK’S CHILD
PROTECTIVE SERVICES SYSTEM (2001), https://nyassembly.gov/comm/Children/20011016/
htmldoc.html#link4 [https://perma.cc/V6XJ-RQ4D] (“The purpose of the Family Court Act’s child
abuse and neglect provisions is to help safeguard the physical, mental, and emotional well-being of
abused and neglected children by establishing civil procedures to protect them.”); see also Douglas J.
Besharov, Family Court Handling of Child Protective Cases, 53 N.Y. STATE BAR J. 113, 114-15 (1981)
(discussing that while family court began with a fundamentally “rehabilitative” focus, child
protective proceedings subsequently became more “formalized” as family court judges recognized
the need for judicial decision-making). Family court has jurisdiction over a variety of other civil
matters including juvenile delinquency, child support, and paternity. See generally FAM. CT. ACT
§§ 111-1122 (compiling the laws governing the establishment and administration of family court,
including its subject matter jurisdiction).
11 See SHEPPARD & ZANGRILLO, supra note 4, at 3-4 (“Rarely does law enforcement investigate
cases of child neglect or minor physical abuse reported to CPS unless they meet provisions in
criminal statutes applying to criminal neglect or abuse.”).
12 See CARL B. HAMMOND, KENNETH V. LANNING, WAYNE PROMISEL, JACK R. SHEPHERD
& BILL WALSH, OFF. OF JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., LAW
ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE TO CHILD ABUSE 2 (2d prtg. 2001) (listing factors contributing to
children’s vulnerability as potentially including physical and mental development, an emotional
connection between a child and the abuser, and the long duration of child abuse and neglect crimes).
Children’s weakness and dependency on adults make them susceptible to different types of violence; as
a result, “children suffer far more victimization than do members of other age groups.” Eugene M.
Lewit & Linda Schuurmann Baker, Children as Victims of Violence, 6 JUV. CT. 147, 147 (1996).
13 See, e.g., Detectives, N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/bureaus/
investigative/detectives.page [https://perma.cc/P885-892B] (describing the Special Victims Division
as responsible for sex crimes and child abuse); Special Victims Bureau, BROOKLYN DIST. ATTY’S OFF.,
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Despite the systems’ distinct purposes, New York law requires CPS and
law enforcement to frequently14 work together to protect children.15 New
York’s guiding child welfare law, the Child Protective Services Act of 1973,16
requires child welfare administrators to consult with law enforcement in
crafting their county-level Child and Family Services Plan, which sets out
how the county agency will conform to the Social Services Law.17 In addition,
various statutes provide for the mandatory and voluntary transmission of
CPS reports to the district attorney in a given county.18 Each local CPS
agency must also enter into a formal cooperation agreement with local law
enforcement to deﬁne the procedures governing the referral of cases from
CPS to the district attorney and communication between the agencies.19 In
some civil cases, law enforcement will play only a limited operational support
role for CPS caseworkers carrying out investigations.20 For example, the
presence of a police oﬃcer can protect a CPS caseworker’s safety when the
caseworker may encounter a dangerous situation during a home visit,
especially if the caseworker plans to remove a child from the home.21
The relationship between the two agencies is more complicated, and
perhaps even fraught, when law enforcement is pursuing a criminal case
alongside CPS’ civil action.22 In other words, two formally distinct legal
http://www.brooklynda.org/special-victims-division [https://perma.cc/HLR5-3GJH] (describing the
Special Victims Bureau as responsible for the same subject matter as the police’s Special Victims
Division and stating that there is cooperation between the two offices).
14 See generally Theodore P. Cross, David Finkelhor & Richard Ormrod, Police Involvement in
Child Protective Services Investigations: Literature Review and Secondary Data Analysis, 10 CHILD
MALTREATMENT 224, 224 (2005) (noting the co-involvement in cases is common).
15 See N.Y. STATE OFF. OF CHILD. & FAM. SERVS., CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES MANUAL
ch. 6 L-1 (2020) [hereinafter CPS MANUAL] (describing law enforcement’s complementary role in
supporting CPS).
16 N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW §§ 411-428 (McKinney 2020).
17 Id. § 423(3)(a); see also CNTY. OF MONROE, Required Interagency Consultations, in MONROE
COUNTY CHILD & FAMILY SERVICES PLAN 1 (2018), https://www2.monroecounty.gov/ﬁles/hs/
APPROVED%202018-2023%20Child%20and%20Family%20Services%20Plan.pdf [https://perma.
cc/ZP44-MLWM] (showing that state and local law enforcement were consulted in the creation of
an upstate county’s Child and Family Services Plan).
18 See SOC. SERV. § 424(5-a) (requiring CPS to transmit reports involving the death or
physical or sexual abuse of a child); id. § 424(4) (allowing the district attorney to request and receive
all CPS reports in a given county).
19 See CPS MANUAL, supra note 15, at ch. 6 L-4 (stating the requirement); id. at ch. 14 K-1–K-6
(providing a model memorandum of understanding). For an example of actual agreement between the
two agencies, see MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING CPS/DA (2011), [https://perma.cc/BR86W6DM], which defines the roles of CPS and the district attorney in Rockland County and requires
CPS to transmit its cases when it “appears that a crime may have been committed.”
20 See DONNA PENCE & CHARLES WILSON, THE ROLE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE
RESPONSE TO CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 6-7 (1992).
21 See id.
22 See Cross et al., supra note 14, at 224 (“The two disciplines have expressed a contradictory
mix of apprehension and enthusiasm about working together.”).
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regimes “must investigate the same incident, involving the same people,”23 in
a process also known as parallel enforcement.24 While scholars have not yet
comprehensively examined family law and criminal law through the lens of
parallel enforcement,25 a framework that centers the diﬀerent actors,
processes, and remedies available in each system can allow policymakers to
see and appreciate the points at which the agencies’ competencies and
authority overlap, as well as where they diverge.
In over forty New York cities and counties, the state has attempted to create
a synergistic relationship between the two agencies through multidisciplinary
teams (MDTs), often deployed within a local Child Advocacy Center (CAC).26
23 PENCE & WILSON, supra note 20, at 7; see also id. (using the phrase “parallel investigation” in
this setting); Stephanie Clifford & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Foster Care as Punishment: The New
Reality of ‘Jane Crow,’ N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/21/
nyregion/foster-care-nyc-jane-crow.html [https://perma.cc/U6FX-JTAH] (“In New York, authorities
pursue child neglect cases on two tracks. The district attorney can file a criminal charge of child
endangerment; separately, [ACS] can file a family court case . . . .”).
24 Cf. Anthony O’Rourke, Parallel Enforcement and Agency Interdependence, 77 MD. L. REV. 985,
985-86 (2018) (deﬁning parallel enforcement as “[p]rosecutors and civil regulators . . . combin[ing]
their resources to pursue concurrent actions against the same defendant in a variety of domains”).
25 That being said, scholars have applied this framework in specific settings in the broader child
welfare context. See, e.g., William Wesley Patton, The World Where Parallel Lines Converge: The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination in Concurrent Civil and Criminal Child Abuse Proceedings, 24 GA. L. REV. 473
(1990) (examining the Fifth Amendment implications of concurrent or consolidated proceedings);
Emily A. Cook, Comment, Separate, Parallel Paths—These Lines Should Never Cross: Why Texas Needs a
Bright-Line Rule to Determine When a Child Protective Services Agent Acts as a Law Enforcement Agent,
366 TEX. TECH L. REV. 365, 371 (2008) (criticizing a lack of clarity with respect to Fifth Amendment
protections to statements made to Texas CPS agents). But see O’Rourke, supra note 24, at 985-86
(identifying current scholarship on parallel enforcement in the areas of financial regulation,
immigration, environmental law, and taxation, but not explicitly child welfare). Perhaps one reason
why family law is not commonly considered in this context is because parallel enforcement is strongly
associated with federal laws and regulations, and child welfare is essentially a state matter. See U.S.
Dep’t of Just., Justice Manual § 1-12.000 (2018) (discussing how United States Attorneys must
coordinate criminal investigations and parallel regulatory matters against corporate defendants);
Stacey Mitchell & Amanda Kane, Parallel Proceedings or Piling On?, AM. BAR ASS’N (July 2, 2018),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/environment_energy_resources/publications/trends/2017-2018/julyaugust-2018/parallel_proceedings [https://perma.cc/38H2-LHDK] (discussing parallel enforcement of
environmental crimes and issues by federal agencies).
26 See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 423-A(1) (McKinney 2020) (mandating that the Office of
Children and Family Services establish CACs “to the greatest extent practicable”); see also id. § 423(6)
(allowing a district-level agency to create such a program). New York’s CACs are located around the
state, and recent efforts have sought to expand their accessibility to child victims. See New York CACs,
NE. REG’L CHILD.’S ADVOCACY CTR. (2020), https://www.nrcac.org/find-a-cac/new-york-state-cacs
[https://perma.cc/EWQ2-W5XD] (detailing locations of CACs in New York State); Governor Cuomo
Announces Over $4 Million to Support Child Advocacy Centers and Mobile Units, N.Y. STATE (Dec. 28,
2018), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-announces-over-4-million-support-childadvocacy-centers-and-mobile-units [https://perma.cc/VX5R-QDVQ] (announcing the establishment
of mobile CACs to reach more rural areas of the state). The large number of CACs in New York is
consistent with the national trend toward the establishment of such facilities. See Multidisciplinary Team,
NAT’L CHILD.’S ADVOC. CTR. (2019), https://www.nationalcac.org/multidisciplinary-team [https://
perma.cc/VRZ8-3375] (noting that more than 1,000 CACs have opened in the United States since 1985).
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The MDT/CAC model aims to centralize the government’s response to cases
of child abuse and neglect in a “safe, child-focused environment.”27 Not all child
abuse and neglect cases are investigated at the CAC; rather, the CAC is
designed for cases in which “[criminal] prosecution may be a component,”28
and particularly for those cases involving “sexual abuse or serious physical
abuse.”29 The MDT—composed of law enforcement, CPS, a forensic
interviewer, a mental health provider, a medical professional, and a family
advocate—coordinates the response in order to preserve the integrity of
investigations and avoid retraumatizing the child victim.30 A key feature of the
CAC is its one-time interview of the child by a trained professional, which
avoids requiring the child to repeat the narrative of abuse.31 While not every
professional in the MDT is required to be involved in every case, members
with investigative roles (i.e., police, district attorney, and CPS) “must
participate in joint interviews and conduct investigative functions consistent
with the mission of the specific agency member involved.”32 As such, the two
agencies now work together as a matter of daily practice, even if they are not
always unified in the pursuit of the same end goal.
B. CPS Investigation and Family Court
With the key stakeholders and institutions now introduced, it is possible to
chart the development of a typical child abuse or neglect case. Here, it is
important to note that any case involves a number of junctures at which either
CPS or law enforcement can open, continue, or end an investigation or court
action. First, a report is made to the statewide central register either by a
community member or mandatory reporter33 (i.e., a person who is obliged to
27 See How the CAC Model Works, NAT’L CHILD.’S ALL. (2019) https://www.
nationalchildrensalliance.org/cac-model [https://perma.cc/KTY8-HQME] (describing a typical CAC).
28 CPS MANUAL, supra note 15, at ch. 6 L-7.
29 See SOC. SERV. § 423-A(1). One possible explanation for this limitation on the use of the
MDT/CAC model is the resource-intensive nature of this approach. In less serious cases in which
the investigators do not employ the MDT/CAC model, the cases will be pursued in parallel, with
the police and CPS separately working with the victim and possible witnesses. See generally
HAMMOND ET AL., supra note 12, at 6-7 ﬁg.1 (providing considerations for a police oﬃcer to take
into account when investigating child abuse, including advice on how to interview the child victim
and obtain evidence from the crime scene).
30 See How the CAC Model Works, supra note 27.
31 Id.; see Memorandum from the N.Y. State Oﬀ. of Child. & Fam. Servs. Div. of Child Welfare
& Cmty Servs. on Multidisciplinary Teams and Child Abuse Investigations to Loc. Dist. Comm’rs,
10-OCFS-LCM-09, at 2 (Aug. 9, 2010) (endorsing the empirical support for the eﬀectiveness of
MDTs, especially the reduced need for multiple interviews, provision of victim services, and clear
communication with the family).
32 CPS MANUAL, supra note 15, at ch. 6 L-7.
33 See SOC. SERV. § 413(1)(a) (listing a large number of mandatory reporters including
physicians, registered nurses, and school administrators and teachers); id. § 414 (allowing any other
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report suspected neglect or abuse because of work with children).34 CPS is
obligated to begin a preliminary investigation within twenty-four hours, which
includes a face-to-face or telephone interview with the child and review of prior
CPS involvement in the household.35 If the allegation involves serious physical
or sexual abuse, CPS must immediately notify law enforcement so that a joint
investigation through the use of an established MDT or ad hoc team will be
launched.36 At the CAC, the MDT will conduct the forensic interview and may
collect evidence (including through taking photos and interviewing other
witnesses), and conduct a medical exam and provide treatment.37
Regardless of whether the child was brought to the CAC, CPS must
comply with a host of regulatory requirements before “making a
determination” on the report.38 In addition to interviewing the child, these
requirements include, but are not limited to, interviewing the reporter and
other reporting sources, conducting a safety assessment at the child’s home
within one week of receiving the report, obtaining information about other
children in the home, and communicating with the person under investigation
about the status of the case.39 Within sixty days, CPS must make a final
determination with regard to whether there is “enough evidence to support
the claim that the child has been abused or neglected.”40 It will then “indicate”
or “unfound” a report.41 If the report is unfounded, the investigation ends,
although CPS may still provide the family with social services.42
If CPS indicates the report, it has several options at its disposal, including
oﬀering rehabilitative services and, if needed, making arrangements to move
the child and other children in the home into an out-of-home placement.43
person to ﬁle a report). A mandatory reporter who fails to report “suspected child abuse or
maltreatment” may be subject to criminal sanctions and civil liability. Id. § 420.
34 See id. § 415 (describing the reporting procedure); CPS MANUAL, supra note 15, at ch. 2 A-1–A-2
(describing the role of and identifying mandatory reporters). Reports can come about in other ways, too.
In the most serious cases, a report comes about not because of a direct report to CPS but rather because
of a 9-1-1 call concerning a crime against a child, see How the CAC Model Works, supra note 27, while in
a “masked incident,” the police discover evidence of abuse or neglect while responding to a different
crime altogether, see Cross et al., supra note 14, at 226.
35 SOC. SERV. § 424(6)(a); CPS MANUAL, supra note 15, at ch. 6 B-1.
36 SOC. SERV. § 424(5-a)–(5-b). CPS may also be obligated to notify law enforcement
pursuant to a local agreement, see CPS MANUAL, supra note 15, at ch. 6 L-1, or may do so
discretionarily, see SOC. SERV. § 424(5-a).
37 How the CAC Model Works, supra note 27.
38 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 432.2(b)(3)(iv) (2020).
39 Id. § 432.2(b)(3)(ii).
40 A Parent’s Guide to a Child Abuse Investigation, N.Y.C. ADMIN. FOR CHILD.’S SERVS.,
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/acs/child-welfare/parents-guide-child-abuse-investigation.page [https://
perma.cc/NX4D-8BHR].
41 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 432.2(b)(3)(iv).
42 See A Parent’s Guide to a Child Abuse Investigation, supra note 40.
43 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 432.2(b)(4)(i)–(iii).
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Critically, all of this can take place without any oﬃcial action in family
court.44 In all cases, CPS is required to “assess whether the best interests of
the child require Family Court or Criminal Court action and initiate such
action, whenever necessary.”45 At this stage, CPS may petition the family
court for an Article 10 factﬁnding hearing to determine whether the
respondent (“parent, guardian or other person legally responsible for the
child”46) abused or neglected the child.47 If the family court sustains CPS’
petition, the family court will proceed to a dispositional hearing in which it
may enter orders, including removal of the child from the home.48
Once the family court reaches the dispositional stage, state and federal
law require the court to prioritize the best interests of the child while moving
toward the goal of family reuniﬁcation.49 In particular, the Adoption and Safe
44 See id. § 432.2(b)(4)(ii) (“[CPS] may, where appropriate, provide for or arrange for and
coordinate services to children named in child abuse and/or maltreatment reports . . . prior to a
determination as to whether some credible evidence exists as to the alleged abuse or maltreatment.”);
Emily Jennings, Note, Separating Families Without Due Process, 22 CUNY L. REV. 1, 11-12 (2019)
(“Whether or not court intervention is needed depends on the ACS worker’s judgment of the
seriousness and the credibility of the allegations, and the parent’s willingness to agree to services (e.g.,
drug treatment, mental health services) to improve the alleged concerns.”). New York CPS is
authorized to enter into safety plans, or a “clearly identified set of actions, including controlling
interventions when necessary, that have been, or will be taken without delay, to protect child(ren)
from immediate or impending danger or serious harm,” to secure compliance. CPS MANUAL, supra
note 15, at ch. 6 D-2. These plans have been criticized for the lack of judicial oversight involved. See,
e.g., Andrew Brown, Shadow Removals: How Safety Plans Allow CPS to Avoid Judicial Oversight, THE
HILL (May 31, 2019, 9:30 AM), https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/446108-shadow-removals-howsafety-plans-allow-cps-to-avoid-judicial-oversight [https://perma.cc/E92T-2HQM] (arguing that
safety plans are used when a “caseworker has concerns about a family, but lacks sufficient evidence to
convince a court to support a removal” and that the choice to enter into such an agreement is illusory).
CPS caseworkers can use the threat of subsequent family court action to obtain compliance with the
safety plan. See, e.g., In re Kathleen NN., 62 N.Y.S.3d 587, 589 (App. Div. 2017) (showing that a CPS
caseworker informed a child’s mother that the mother’s boyfriend needed to stay away from the child
in accordance with the safety plan and “that there would be court proceedings if he remained”).
45 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 432.2(b)(3)(vi).
46 CPS MANUAL, supra note 15, at ch. 9 C-1.
47 See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1031 (McKinney 2020) (specifying how CPS may begin a proceeding
to determine abuse or neglect). CPS is also authorized to pursue temporary orders such as an order of
protection or an order to compel the respondent to accept services. See generally id. §§ 1021–30
(governing temporary removal and preliminary orders); CPS MANUAL, supra note 15, at ch. 9 C-1.
48 FAM. CT. ACT § 1027(a)(iii); see id. § 1045 (deﬁning a dispositional hearing); CPS
MANUAL, supra note 15, at ch. 9 F-1 (describing the various circumstances in which a child may be
removed from the home). Formally, removal (whether pursuant to an emergency determination or
after a hearing) should only occur when there is an “imminent risk to the child’s life or health.” See
FAM. CT. ACT § 1027(b)(i); cf. Bennett v. Jeﬀreys, 356 N.E.2d 277, 280 (N.Y. 1976) (“The State may
not deprive a parent of the custody of a child absent surrender, abandonment, persisting neglect,
unﬁtness or other like extraordinary circumstances.”).
49 FAM. CT. ACT § 623; see also N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 384-B(1)(a)(ii) (McKinney 2020) (“[I]t
is generally desirable for the child to remain with or be returned to the birth parent because the child’s
need for a normal family life will usually best be met in the home of its birth parent . . . .”). While
CPS must consider the best interests of the child in determining whether to initiate action in family
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Families Act (ASFA), a watershed piece of federal legislation, mandates that
“reasonable eﬀorts shall be made to preserve and reunify families.”50
Placement outside the home triggers biannual permanency hearings at which
the family court judge will approve of a permanency goal—including return
to the child’s parents, adoption following a termination of parental rights,
referral for legal guardianship, or placement with a relative—and evaluate
progress toward the goal.51 In this back and forth with CPS and the family
court, families ﬁnd the system diﬃcult to navigate and unresponsive to their
unique, complicated needs.52 For its part, ASFA has done little to reduce the
court, see N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18 § 432.2(b)(3)(vi), the family unity standard is not
formally operative prior to an adjudication of abuse and neglect by the family court. See FAM. CT.
ACT § 622 (demonstrating the absence of these standards at the factfinding hearing); id. § 1047(a)
(stating that the dispositional hearing follows the factfinding hearing).
50 Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA), Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115; see Smith
v. Org. of Foster Fams. for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 843 (1977) (noting the importance of the
“blood relation” between parent and child in Supreme Court case law). Professor Richard Gelles has
vociferously argued against aggressive reunification efforts with biological families, contending that
such efforts rarely succeed and that that prolonged attempts to achieve reunification can harm child
welfare. See Richard J. Gelles, Protecting Children Is More Important Than Preserving Families, in
CURRENT CONTROVERSIES ON FAMILY VIOLENCE 329, 331-34 (Donileen R. Loseke, Richard J.
Gelles & Mary M. Cavanaugh eds., 2005).
51 FAM. CT. ACT § 1027(h) (setting the requirement for the initial permanency hearing); id.
§ 1089 (regulating the content and timing of permanency hearings). Section 1089 belongs to Article
10-A of the Family Court Act, which was passed in December 2005 to enhance compliance with
ASFA, demonstrating federal inﬂuence over state child welfare law. See Alicia Summers & Christine
Sabino Kiesel, Enhancing the Quality of Hearings in New York State: Using Data to Drive Improvement,
AM. BAR ASS’N (Jan. 1, 2016), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_interest/child_law/
resources/child_law_practiceonline/child_law_practice/vol-35/january-2016/enhancing-the-qualityof-hearings-in-new-york-state--using-data- [https://perma.cc/FF3T-ZK8W]. In 1999, New York
became the last state to come into conformity with ASFA, which requires that “reasonable efforts shall
be made to preserve and reunify families.” See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B); FAM. CT. ACT § 1039-b
(allowing the state to petition to lift the reasonable efforts requirement); In re Marino S., 795 N.E.2d
21, 25 n.3 (N.Y. 2003) (“New York was the last of the 50 states to conform its law to the federal statute.”).
While New York law is designed to embody a “constant concern for prompt permanency in a child’s
life,” id. at 25, the 2005 law’s demand for fast permanency hearings has “added pressure to an
overburdened court system.” See Summers & Kiesel, supra.
52 See Victoria Weisz, Sarah J. Beal & Twila Wingrove, The Legal System Experiences of Child,
Families, and Professionals Who Work with Them, in STRESS, TRAUMA, & WELLBEING IN THE LEGAL
SYSTEM 63, 63, 74 (Monica K. Miller & Brian H. Borenstein eds., 2012) (“Resolution to the problems
and struggles families are experiencing is sought, but resolution is often ambiguous, without a clear
sense of what a fair outcome would be.”); ABIGAIL KRAMER, CTR. FOR N.Y.C. AFFS., IS REFORM
FINALLY COMING TO NEW YORK CITY FAMILY COURT? 3, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/
53ee4f0be4b015b9c3690d84/t/569e7d8bbfe8737de9301b71/1453227404613/CWW+%7C+Is+Reform+Fi
nally+Coming+to+Family+Court%3F.pdf [https://perma.cc/C82M-EF9Q] (“[T]he city’s Family
Courts are chronically overburdened and under-resourced, plagued by high caseloads, overworked
staff, and a stubborn legacy of dysfunction and delay. Getting from the start to the end of a case is
almost never straightforward.”); Sandra Bass, Margie K. Shields & Richard E. Behrman, Children,
Families, and Foster Care: Analysis and Recommendations, FUTURE CHILD., Winter 2004, at 4, 23
(“Courts play a central role in child welfare decision making, but most children and families regard
them as foreboding and distant.”).
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complex nature of family court cases, which “require[] judicial oversight
across multiple hearings” in a setting where rules are largely shaped by
judicial actors and the family court system itself.53
C. System Clash
While CPS’ institutional focus is on child and family aﬀairs, law
enforcement approaches the investigation of child abuse and neglect under
the same basic framework it uses for the prosecution of any other crime.54
Whether investigating under the MDT/CAC model or on its own, law
enforcement’s primary concern is “build[ing] criminal cases against alleged
oﬀenders” through collecting evidence and preparing the case for prosecution
and eventual punishment.55 Here, parallel enforcement can create ripe
opportunities for conﬂict. First and centrally, “criminal law and family law
serve diﬀerent, incompatible purposes.”56 Unlike criminal law, which is
concerned with retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation,57
family law seeks the practical resolution of issues in family life.58 Whereas
criminal law “send[s] normative messages” to the wider society based on

53 Summers & Kiesel, supra note 51; cf. SOPHIE I. GATOWSKI, NANCY B. MILLER, STEPHEN
M. RUBIN, PATRICIA ESCHER & CANDICE MAZE, NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUV. & FAM. CT. JUDGES,
ENHANCED RESOURCE GUIDELINES: IMPROVING COURT PRACTICE IN CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT CASES 7-8 (2016) (explaining that while ASFA codified several positive reforms, it also
transformed family court judges into “the gatekeepers of our nation’s foster care system,” creating new
and often unmanageable levels of stress on the system that makes achieving permanency difficult).
54 See PENCE & WILSON, supra note 20, at 5 (“Law enforcement oﬃcers tend to view child
abuse and neglect not as a social problem, but rather in the context of criminal law . . . .”). Of course,
there are some aspects involving the prosecution of these crimes that are unique beyond the use of
specialized personnel, such as the need to establish the fact that a crime against the child actually
took place. See id. This is distinct from, for example, a burglary, where there is a presumption that a
crime has actually occurred. See id. (“[I]f Mrs. Jones reports her house has been burglarized, the
responding oﬃcers can enter the case with the presumption that a crime has occurred . . . .”).
Similarly, and reﬂective of the weight placed on successfully prosecuting crimes against children,
New York has developed a special toll on the statute of limitations for certain major sex crimes
against children. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.10(3)(f) (McKinney 2020).
55 SHEPPARD & ZANGRILLO, supra note 4, at 4.
56 Samuel V. Schoonmaker, Criminal Law or Family Law: The Overlapping Issues, 44 FAM. L.Q. 155,
155 (2010); accord Viola W. Lindsey, Child Abuse Investigations: How CPS and Law Enforcement Engage
in Collaboration 3 (June 2011) (Ph.D. dissertation, Loma Linda University), https://scholarsrepository.
llu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1040&context=etd [https://perma.cc/KN6V-3QCV] (“Dissimilarity in
professional philosophies and belief systems around the matter of punishment versus treatment continues
to be a major source of conflict between CPS social workers and law enforcement officers.”).
57 See generally SANFORD H. KADISH, STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER & RACHEL E. BARKOW,
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 96 (10th ed. 2017) (identifying these goals).
58 See Schoonmaker, supra note 56, at 156 (“[Family law’s] primary purpose is to stabilize and
preserve families by solving practical problems . . . .”).

880

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 169: 867

judgments about past behavior, family law seeks to stabilize and improve the
future situations of the individuals and families that come within its reach.59
This diﬀerence in mission is reﬂected in the agencies’ workplace cultures
and practices.60 To begin, the two organizations operate in an environment in
which there is a perceived hierarchy between them, as “[l]aw enforcement’s
authority is . . . much more widely accepted than the CPS authority.”61 This
public view, which is rooted in beliefs about the police’s forcefulness, can be
seen within the organizations as well.62 Generally, police are trained to make
decisions rapidly in the ﬁeld without immediate oversight, while social
workers operate within a team model that emphasizes extensive
consultation.63 Relatedly, whereas the police are primarily focused on past
conduct, CPS has an interest in developing and maintaining a “cooperative
and productive relationship” with the family in order to fulﬁll its legal
mandate to consider the interests of the family unit.64 These divides represent
a major barrier to cooperation, as law enforcement views CPS as slow to react
and CPS, in turn, perceives law enforcement as rash.65 With regard to CPS,
some police oﬃcers think, “I want to deal with the bad guys; you go talk to
the kids,” while CPS caseworkers emphasize that “[a]ll crimes are social
problems.”66 These speciﬁc issues exacerbate more generic problems related
to “interorganizational coordination,” especially concerning institutional
loyalty to one’s own agency.67

See id. at 156-57.
See NAT’L INST. OF JUST. & NAT’L CTR. ON CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT, JOINT
INVESTIGATIONS OF CHILD ABUSE 7-8 (1993) [hereinafter NIJ/NNCCAN REPORT] (“Failure to
understand these differences can lead to mutual suspicion, reinforced by professional loyalty and even
insularity.”); see also Lindsey, supra note 56, at 1-3 (“[T]he two entities have traditionally approached an
investigation from very different perspectives, creating conflict and biases in their working relationships.”).
61 See PENCE & WILSON, supra note 20, at 7 (“Many times CPS caseworkers are denied access
to alleged victims of maltreatment while law enforcement’s requests to see the child are honored.”).
62 See id. (noting that CPS workers who are accorded the same authority as law enforcement
oﬃcers to forcibly remove children from their homes often do not exercise this authority without
police assistance); accord Lindsey, supra note 56, at 72 (concluding, from questionnaire responses
gathered from 192 police oﬃcers, that law enforcement oﬃcers describe themselves as more forceful
and aggressive than social workers).
63 PENCE & WILSON, supra note 20, at 9; see Lindsey, supra note 56, at 8-10 (describing
“[d]iﬀerences in socialization” between the agencies). Of course, social workers in the ﬁeld may also
need to make high-stakes decisions in emergencies. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1024(a) (McKinney
2020) (granting social workers the authority to remove a child without parental consent or a court
order in an emergency situation).
64 See CPS MANUAL, supra note 15, at ch. 6 F-3; accord PENCE & WILSON, supra note 20, at 9.
65 See PENCE & WILSON, supra note 20, at 9.
66 NIJ/NNCCAN REPORT, supra note 60, at 7-8.
67 Laura F. Skaff, Child Maltreatment Coordinating Committees for Effective Service Delivery, 67 CHILD
WELFARE 217, 219 (1988); see also id. at 222 (identifying differing objectives, financing, turf disputes, and
community denial as problems in establishing committees designed to coordinate the community’s
59
60
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A lack of dialogue between the two systems creates risks for the agencies’
operations. Particularly in cases in which there is no joint investigation (i.e.,
with an MDT/CAC model), there are heightened chances for redundancy
and inconsistency, as CPS caseworkers and police “may conduct separate,
parallel investigations, visiting homes independently and conducting separate
interviews” with little interaction between the agencies.68 At the investigation
stage, CPS might accidentally tamper with or destroy physical evidence69 or
produce unhelpful or conﬂicting pieces of evidence that may eventually
become discoverable impeachment material in a criminal case.70 In the
interim, law enforcement may view any visitation between the child and the
biological parents as compromising the criminal investigation,71 while CPS
may view such contact as legally mandated72 as well as therapeutic.73 Later
on, CPS might desire a disposition focused on services in an intrafamilial
matter, a goal that would obviously be undermined by law enforcement
seeking a criminal conviction and perhaps incarceration.74 Further
complicating this dynamic is the “dizzying nature” of simultaneous

response to child abuse and neglect); NIJ/NNCCAN REPORT, supra note 60, at 10 (“Turf battles, politics,
and administrative rigidity influence the behavior of too many people in leadership positions.”).
68 Cross et al., supra note 14, at 3-4.
69 See PENCE & WILSON, supra note 20, at 10.
70 See CIV. ACTION PRAC. OF THE BRONX DEFS., THE CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS IN NEW YORK STATE 6 (2015) (explaining that collateral proceedings, such as in
family court, “can be a useful source of discovery for the criminal defense attorney” and can have
hidden consequences in criminal cases); cf. How the CAC Model Works, supra note 27 (warning against
“a well-meaning teacher or other adult” asking the “wrong questions” of the child victim and thereby
jeopardizing the case). Other actors’ improper interviewing of the child victim can complicate an
eventual prosecution in other ways, too. See, e.g., People v. Michael M., 618 N.Y.S.2d 171, 177-78
(Sup. Ct., Kings Cnty. 1994) (granting a defendant’s motion for a suppression hearing on the basis
of allegedly suggestive questioning by a physician concerning sexual abuse).
71 See PENCE & WILSON, supra note 20, at 9-10 (observing that law enforcement oﬃcers
sometimes suspect abusive parents use visitations primarily to pressure their children into recanting
their criminal allegations).
72 See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1030 (McKinney 2020) (granting respondents in Article 10
proceedings “the right to reasonable and regularly scheduled visitation with a child” removed from
the home absent a court determination that such visitation would pose a risk to the child).
73 See PENCE & WILSON, supra note 20, at 9-10; cf. N.Y. State Oﬀ. of Child. & Fam. Servs.
Admin. Directive 17-OCFS-ADM-14, Family Visiting Policy for Children in Foster Care, at 2 (Oct.
5, 2017) (“Frequent and consistent parent-child contact that takes place in as natural an environment
as possible preserves the emotional attachment of parents and children to each other, reduces the
trauma of separation for both the child and the parent, allows parents to practice day-to-day
parenting skills, and can expedite reuniﬁcation.”).
74 See PENCE & WILSON, supra note 20, at 10 (“In intrafamilial cases, recommendation for
treatment outside of the correctional system has been a fairly common procedure for CPS staﬀ. The
vast majority of law enforcement oﬃcers are extremely skeptical about the eﬃcacy of most treatment
programs and, indeed, about the expertise of most therapists.”).
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proceedings in the family and criminal court systems, which might issue
“duplicative, conﬂicting or incompatible orders.”75
Thus, while MDTs and CACs may improve some aspects of the case,
particularly at the investigative stage,76 they cannot entirely deconﬂict parallel
investigations.77 Experts have critiqued this lack of coordination for some
time and have stressed that “[t]he investigatory processes and goals of both
agencies need to be complementary rather than in conﬂict with each other.”78
Certainty, there are cases in which the agencies must cooperate more closely
to perform eﬀectively. But it is also important to recognize that the systems
are not locked in an irreconcilable conﬂict. On the contrary, both systems
selectively borrow from the logic of parallel enforcement to enable the two
formally separate regimes to work hand-in-hand across a variety of areas,
exceeding the type of organizational cooperation contemplated by existing
law. The ensuing lack of clarity as to which agency is responsible for what
tasks blurs the theoretical lines between the systems, breaking down restraints
on their respective roles and thereby maximizing the state’s coercive capacity
over those under investigation.
II. REBALANCING PARALLEL ENFORCEMENT
Despite philosophical differences between CPS and law enforcement, the
conflict between the two may be more superficial than the evidence reviewed
here immediately suggests. Parallel enforcement allows the state to pursue
separate civil and criminal investigations for the same conduct, resulting in the
overenforcement of child welfare and criminal laws in poverty-related neglect
75 Schoonmaker, supra note 56, at 157; see, e.g., Samantha WW. v. Gerald XX., 969 N.Y.S.2d
180, 183 (App. Div. 2013) (describing a situation in which a family court order requiring a mother to
facilitate contact with the child’s father would directly violate a criminal court order of protection
against the father with regard to the mother).
76 See James Leslie Herbert & Leah Bromﬁeld, Evidence for the Eﬃcacy of the Child Advocacy
Center Model: A Systematic Review, 17 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE 341, 353 (2015) (stating that
while there is some evidence that CACs provide law enforcement with advantages “earlier in the
criminal justice process” and in building “a stronger case,” the scope of such beneﬁts is undercut
because of the relative scarcity of criminal trials).
77 See Marina Lalayants & Irwin Epstein, Evaluating Multidisciplinary Child Abuse and Neglect
Teams: A Research Agenda, 84 CHILD WELFARE 434, 453-54 (2005) (summarizing the literature on
MDT eﬀectiveness and concluding that MDTs generally provide beneﬁts including improved
communication, access to expertise, and reduced redundancies, but also noting potential diﬃculties
related to diﬀering philosophies and diﬀused responsibility among the professionals involved).
There is signiﬁcant variance in terms of eﬀectiveness studies’ measurement criteria. See Herbert &
Bromﬁeld, supra note 76, at 348 (reviewing the contemporary literature and concluding that studies
of CAC eﬀectiveness tend to focus on law enforcement goals and only rarely on the more familycentric outcomes relevant to CPS).
78 INGER J. SAGATUN & LEONARD P. EDWARDS, CHILD ABUSE AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM
115 (1995).
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cases. Although parallel enforcement suggests that the systems are distinct, it
simultaneously justifies cooperation between them, which strengthens both. As
such, moving more of these cases into the civil system exclusively would relieve
the burdens associated with parallel enforcement. At the same time, law
enforcement underenforces cases of serious child abuse, sometimes because
nonoffending caregivers refuse to cooperate with the authorities. Contrary to
popular views about caretakers, noncooperation may derive from the blurred
lines between the two systems and uncertainty about the potential costs of
cooperation. One step toward overcoming this uncertainty is providing
caregivers with clarity about the roles of the civil and criminal systems.
A. Overenforcement of Neglect
In the past decades, CPS and law enforcement have been increasingly
willing to pursue low-level allegations of child neglect and seek serious
remedies in family and criminal court.79 The dual pursuit of these cases
represents a full embrace of parallel enforcement. Because the statutes
governing neglect and agencies’ procedures do not clearly delineate each
agency’s role, each may pursue its own goals without regard to what the other
is doing; that is to say, the investigations can be truly parallel. In practice, the
doubling is excessive relative to the harm in neglect cases.80 Insofar as each
agency pursues increasingly punitive goals, the end eﬀect is compounded civil
and criminal penalties in neglect cases, undermining both systems’ concern
with protecting child welfare.
1. CPS as “Police-Lite”
In pursuing child abuse and neglect cases, CPS activity has frequently
come to resemble an underregulated form of policing. In recent years,
scholars have paid increased attention to and warned against the national
trend toward the criminalization of various aspects of family law and family
life.81 This trend has harmed the relationship between CPS and the
communities that the agency is meant to support.
See infra subsections II.A.1.a–b, II.A.2.a.
See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose and practice of parallel
enforcement).
81 See, e.g., DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE 74
(2002) (describing the child welfare system’s focus on “child protection” over “child welfare” as the
system’s “fundamental ﬂaw” and noting that as a result, parents in inner-city neighborhoods “view
caseworkers more as law enforcement agents than social service providers”); Elizabeth D. Katz,
Criminal Law in a Civil Guise: The Evolution of Family Courts and Support Laws, 86 U. CHI. L. REV.
1241, 1278-95 (2019) (analyzing the shift from criminal enforcement of child support nonpayment to
adjudication in nominally civil family courts that nevertheless maintained criminal court-like
powers); Andrea L. Dennis, Criminal Law as Family Law, 33 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 285, 336-51 (2017)
79
80
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a. CPS’ Broad Mandate
Several factors have pushed family law in New York toward
criminalization. First, CPS has a broad mandate to protect “abused and
maltreated children.”82 In particular, New York deﬁnes a “neglected child” as
a child younger than eighteen years old “whose physical, mental or emotional
condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of being impaired as a
result of the failure of his parent or [PLR] to exercise a minimum degree of
care” with respect to the provision of “food, clothing, shelter or education . . .
though ﬁnancially able to do so or oﬀered ﬁnancial or other reasonable means
to do so.”83 The failure to meet the requisite standard of care also applies to
“proper supervision or guardianship,” the inﬂiction (or allowing the
inﬂiction) of harm, including “excessive corporal punishment,” drug or
alcohol abuse, “or by any acts of a similarly serious nature requiring the aid
of the court.”84 As such, the statute is quite broad.
For some time, New York family courts struggled to parse this statutory
language, but the Court of Appeals ﬁnally provided clarity in 2004.85 In
Nicholson v. Scoppetta, plaintiﬀs brought a section 1983 federal class action
against ACS86 for its practice of removing children who had witnessed
domestic violence from their mothers.87 In responding to certiﬁed questions
from the Second Circuit, New York’s highest court—the Court of Appeals—
tightened the neglect standard.88 The court ﬁrst explained that a neglect claim
requires both a showing of “actual (or imminent danger of) physical,
emotional or mental impairment to the child,” which includes the
demonstration of a causal connection between the parent’s behavior and the
child’s injury.89 Second, the standard for “minimum degree of care” is that of
(explaining that community supervision associated with the criminal law system interferes with
many aspects of family life, including cohabitation choices, living spaces, relationships and
caretaking, stability, and loyalty); Melissa Murray, The Space Between: The Cooperative Regulation of
Criminal Law and Family Law, 44 FAM. L.Q. 227, 230-31 (2010) (contending that criminal law
supports family law in enforcing a normative vision of family life rooted in marriage).
82 See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW §§ 411–12 (McKinney 2020) (establishing the mandate).
83 See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1012(f)(i)(A) (McKinney 2020).
84 See id. § 1012(f)(i)(B). The abandonment of a child by a parent or guardian may also
constitute neglect. See id. § 1012(f)(ii). The statutory deﬁnitions of abuse and neglect share some
features. See id. § 1012(e)(i) (deﬁning an “abused child” as a child younger than eighteen years old
whose parent or PLR “inﬂicts or allows to be inﬂicted upon such child physical injury by other than
accidental means which causes or creates substantial risk of death, or serious or protracted
disﬁgurement, or protracted impairment of physical or emotional health or protracted loss or
impairment of the function of any bodily organ”).
85 See Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 820 N.E.2d 840 (N.Y. 2004).
86 ACS is the name for CPS in New York City. See supra note 5.
87 See Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 344 F.3d 154, 161 (2d Cir. 2003).
88 Nicholson, 820 N.E.2d at 844.
89 Id. at 845 (construing FAM. CT. ACT § 1012(f)(i)).
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a “reasonable and prudent person in similar circumstances.”90 Critically, the
court stated, this inquiry should not turn on the caretaker’s particular
economic or social circumstances; in other words, the family court “will focus
on serious harm or potential harm to the child, not just on what might be
deemed undesirable parental behavior.”91 While the Nicholson decision had
“wide-ranging positive eﬀects” in reducing child removals in domestic
violence cases,92 it has not appeared to have had the same eﬀect in the other
contexts that give rise to child neglect cases.
Indeed, under the existing broad neglect standards there are many
available paths for reporting suspected maltreatment, and partially as a result
of mandatory reporting laws,93 CPS receives a tremendous number of reports.
In federal ﬁscal year (FFY) 2018, New York CPS received 165,311 reports, of
which 79,710 were substantiated, a rate of less than 50%.94 As a result, 218,684
New York children received some sort of CPS intervention that year, an 8.9%
increase in comparison to FFY 2014.95
As a prophylactic measure, CPS overenforcement makes intuitive sense
from the perspective of a caseworker on the front line. After all, every
caseworker fears “letting a child die,” and repeated, high-publicity errors by
a strained child welfare system mobilize enormous popular and political
pressure on the system to be proactive in so-called “foster care panics.”96 Later
Id. at 845-46.
Id. at 845.
See Kathleen A. Copps, Comment, The Good, the Bad, and the Future of Nicholson v.
Scoppetta: An Analysis of the Eﬀects and Suggestions for Further Improvements, 72 ALB. L. REV. 497,
510-17 (2009) (analyzing the implications of the decision in subsequent CPS litigation in the
domestic violence context).
93 See Douglas J. Besharov, “Doing Something” About Child Abuse: The Need to Narrow the Grounds
for State Intervention, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 539, 545 (1985) (concluding that mandatory reporting
laws were “strikingly effective” in increasing the number of reports from the 1960s to the 1980s).
94 CHILD.’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT
2018 12 tbl.2-1, 27 tbl.3-2 (2018) [hereinafter CHILD MALTREATMENT 2018]. All references from the
report are to federal ﬁscal year (FFY) 2018. See id. at 1.
95 Id. at 25 tbl.3-1. The state reported 203,127 children named in reports in 2018. N.Y. STATE
OFF. OF CHILD. & FAM. SERVS., 2018 BRIGHT SPOTS DATA PACKAGE 4 tbl.1 (2018). The small
diﬀerence between the slightly higher federal ﬁgure and this one could be due to the timing of
publication. There are many more children than reports because a report may name more than one
child, or CPS may come to learn of more children in an investigated household later on in the
process. See CPS MANUAL, supra note 15, at ch. 6 B-2 (stating that the CPS safety assessment may
include children not named in the initial report).
96 See Kathryn Joyce, The Crime of Parenting While Poor, NEW REPUBLIC (Feb. 25, 2019),
https://newrepublic.com/article/153062/crime-parenting-poor-new-york-city-child-welfare-agency
-reform [https://perma.cc/RZ5T-BZW5] (“The force of the pendulum swing between child
protection and family preservation is often driven by high-profile tragedies.”); Eli Hager, Is Child
Abuse Really Rising During the Pandemic?, MARSHALL PROJECT (June 15, 2020, 5:00 AM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/06/15/is-child-abuse-really-rising-during-the-pandemic
[https://perma.cc/P8FP-NB2C] (quoting a family defense attorney who described the child
90
91
92
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on, family court judges share those same incentives to favor CPS intervention
because they do not want to risk “making a mistake and having a child die.”97
In particular, systemic failures preceding the January 2006 killing of sevenyear-old Nixzmary Brown by her abusive stepfather in Brooklyn “prompted
an overhaul of [New York City’s] child welfare system.”98 These reform
measures included the removal or reassignment of senior ACS employees,
the hiring of hundreds of new caseworkers as well as, signiﬁcantly, police
liaisons “to ease the sometimes tense relationships between caseworkers and
oﬃcers at police precincts.”99 But while such post-crisis reforms can uncover
and lead to the correction of systemic problems within a child welfare
agency,100 they now represent an overcorrection.
b. Pursuing Neglect and the Strain on Communities
CPS overenforcement is most clearly observable in neglect cases, which
comprised 60.8% of all child maltreatment cases nationally in FFY 2018.101 In
New York, 55.4% of CPS cases involved only neglect, while 40.0% of cases
involved multiple forms of maltreatment.102 Between November 2019 and
welfare system as “particularly, extremely sensitive to the media”); see also Besharov, supra note 93,
at 540 (noting that child protective professionals insert themselves into private family lives more
often than is necessary because of pressure from public concern and news stories of child abuse);
COMM. ON CHILD MALTREATMENT RSCH., POL’Y, & PRAC. FOR THE NEXT DECADE: PHASE
II, NEW DIRECTIONS IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT RESEARCH 207 (Anna C. Petersen,
Joshua Joseph & Monica Feit eds., 2014) (“Because government outsourcing often occurs as a
reaction to a tragic event, political pressures can lead to ignoring strategic planning and creating
overly aggressive implementation schedules and procedures.”); id. at 230-31 (explaining how actions
like mass firings in response to negative media attention following high profile CPS errors makes
internal quality control difficult).
97 See Wendy Jennings, Separating Families Without Due Process: Hidden Child Removals Closer to
Home, 22 CUNY L. REV. 1, 15 n.70 (2019) (citing SPECIAL WELFARE ADVISORY PANEL, ANNIE E.
CASEY FOUND., ADVISORY REPORT ON FRONT LINE AND SUPERVISORY PRACTICE 48 (2000)).
98 See Kareem Fahim, Mother Gets 43 Years in Death of Child, 7, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2008),
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/13/nyregion/13nixzmary.html [https://perma.cc/PST7-G2AM].
Brown’s mother was subsequently convicted of manslaughter and other charges for her failure to
protect her daughter from the abuse. See id.
99 Cindy Rodriguez, ACS Struggles to Remake Itself in Wake of Nixzmary Brown Case, WNYC (Dec. 11,
2006), https://www.wnyc.org/story/82028-acs-struggles-to-remake-itself-in-wake-of-nixzmary-brown-case
[https://perma.cc/MHR3-C3ZU].
100 A citywide investigation after the Brown case found that in 2005, “ACS was having major
diﬃculties conducting thorough and timely child welfare investigations,” resulting in errors in ﬁftyeight of the seventy-ﬁve ACS-involved child fatality cases that year. See OFF. OF THE N.Y.C. PUB.
ADVOC., DANGEROUS MISTAKES: ANALYSIS OF ACS CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INVOLVING CHILD
FATALITIES IN 2005, at 3 (2007) (stating that the errors included “delays in completing investigations
in violation of state law, and failure to interview all applicable parties involved in the case”).
101 CHILD MALTREATMENT 2018, supra note 94, at 21.
102 Id. at 41 tbl.3-8. While the percentage of cases involving only neglect falls below the national
average, New York’s reporting on the fraction of cases involving multiple forms of maltreatment
(40%) was signiﬁcantly higher than the national average. See id. at 21 (stating that nationally, 10.7%
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January 2020, 60% of reports in New York City contained neglect allegations
(with an additional 8% alleging educational neglect), while only 12% of cases
alleged physical abuse.103 As Professor Dorothy Roberts has argued, CPS’
aggressive pursuit of these neglect cases is fundamentally tied to poverty.104
The mere fact that a parent is poor cannot be the basis of a CPS investigation,
but living in poverty often leads to one.105 Poverty creates stress on families
that contributes to the aggressive treatment of children.106 It makes it more
likely that neglect will be reported due to more extensive contact with
authorities who administer beneﬁts and welfare programs.107 And poverty
“may directly cause harms for which parents are held responsible,” such as an
inability to buy food.108 In this context, enforcement, which takes places
mostly “outside the public eye,”109 has serious consequences for family life,
especially in poor communities and the communities of color which
frequently fall under CPS’ microscope.110
The enforcement situation in New York is particularly acute. More
investigations take place in neighborhoods with high levels of childhood

of cases involved physical abuse only and 7.0% sexual abuse only, while 15.5% involved multiple forms
of maltreatment). This may be a result of a new federal classiﬁcation scheme that counts multiple
reports falling within a single maltreatment category only once. See id. at 21.
103 N.Y.C. ADMIN. FOR CHILD.’S SERVS., FLASH MONTHLY INDICATOR REPORT 29 (2020),
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/acs/pdf/data-analysis/flashReports/2020/02.pdf [https://perma.cc/QUS7-5P3H].
104 See ROBERTS, supra note 81, at 34 (“When child protection agencies ﬁnd that children have
been neglected, it usually has to do with being poor.”). There is a strong link between poverty and
child neglect reporting. One recent, fascinating study showed that a $1 increase in the minimum
wage resulted in a 9.6% decrease in neglect reports. Kerri M. Raissian & Lindsey Rose Bullinger,
Money Matters: Does the Minimum Wage Aﬀect Child Maltreatment Rates?, 72 CHILD. & YOUTH
SERVS. REV. 60, 63-64 (2017).
105 See In re Divine W., 74 N.Y.S.3d 849, 851-52 (Fam. Ct., Kings Cnty. 2018) (rejecting poverty
alone as a basis for a finding of neglect after a father provided a CPS caseworker with only limited
information about the housing and supplies for his newborn child); see also id. at 853 (expressing
skepticism at the idea that CPS would subject a family in a wealthier area of New York City to the
same type of questioning about the ability to care for an infant). Similarly, poverty alone cannot be
the basis of an adverse family court finding. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1012(f)(i)(A) (McKinney 2020)
(limiting liability for neglect to cases in which the parent is “financially able” or “offered financial or
other reasonable means” to offer the necessities needed to meet the minimum level of care).
106 See ROBERTS, supra note 81, at 31-32.
107 Id. at 32-33.
108 Id. at 33.
109 Nikita Stewart, How New York City’s Child Welfare Chief Is Trying to Fix His Agency’s Image,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/29/nyregion/how-new-yorks-childwelfare-chief-is-trying-to-ﬁx-his-agencys-image.html [https://perma.cc/EGW5-9PSV].
110 See Surveillance Isn’t Safety—How Overreporting and CPS Monitoring Stress Families and Weakens
Communities, RISE (Sept. 17, 2019) [hereinafter Surveillance Isn’t Safety], http://www.risemagazine.org/
2019/09/surveillance-isnt-safety [https://perma.cc/42Z5-QPXT] (explaining that CPS launches more
investigations in communities of color).
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poverty in which many Black and Hispanic residents live.111 A recent report
separately controlled for both child poverty and race, and concluded that each
correlates with an increased likelihood of investigation.112 In Hunts Point, an
overwhelmingly Hispanic neighborhood in the South Bronx, CPS
investigated 10% of all families in 2017, while in Brownsville, a heavily Black
neighborhood in Brooklyn, CPS investigated almost one-third of families
between 2010 and 2014.113 Mothers in these communities report experiencing
feelings of fear,114 resulting in behaviors that may exacerbate the underlying
conditions that first brought the family under investigation.115 For example,
caregivers may avoid contact with mandatory reporters such as doctors and
teachers out of an abundance of caution.116 In communities where few or lowquality social services are offered, children are cut off from needed supports
that cannot be provided at home.117 Furthermore, the coronavirus crisis, as well
as its associated lockdowns, health effects, and economic consequences, are
falling hardest on the families least equipped to manage such disruptions.118
111 ANGELA BUTEL, CTR. FOR N.Y.C. AFFS., DATA BRIEF: CHILD WELFARE
INVESTIGATIONS AND NEW YORK CITY NEIGHBORHOODS 3 (2019).
112 Id. at 2-4. Interestingly, the report notes that the correlation based on race does not extend
to the indication rate. Id. at 1.
113 See Surveillance Isn’t Safety, supra note 110; see also Hunts Point/Longwood, NYU FURMAN
CTR., https://furmancenter.org/neighborhoods/view/hunts-point-longwood [https://perma.cc/K5XZ
-2EFQ] (providing census data and other information about the neighborhood through 2018);
Brownsville, NYU FURMAN CTR., https://furmancenter.org/neighborhoods/view/brownsville
[https://perma.cc/G4TW-WZCB] (same).
114 See Joyce, supra note 96 (describing intergenerational distrust with regard to CPS
enforcement in New York City).
115 See, e.g., Surveillance Isn’t Safety, supra note 110 (reporting on one mother who experienced
seven investigations and began preemptively taking pictures of her children each day before school
to demonstrate their condition to CPS in the event of a subsequent investigation).
116 See ROBERTS, supra note 81, at 32-33; see also Kelley Fong, Concealment and Constraint: Child
Protective Services Fears and Poor Mothers’ Institutional Engagement, 97 SOC. FORCES 1785, 1794-95
(2018) (evaluating data from Providence, Rhode Island and concluding that low-income mothers
engaged in selective avoidance of “intensive non-proﬁt services like homeless shelters” and were
cautious about releasing information to oﬃcials in institutional settings).
117 See ROBERTS, supra note 81, at 173-200 (“Racism has consistently led to a resolution of this
tension [between punishing the “undeserving poor” and supporting children] that refuses adequate social
support for families and hurts Black families the most.”); see also Dorothy Roberts, Prison, Foster Care,
and the Systemic Punishment of Black Mothers, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1474, 1477-78, 1484 (2012) (explaining that
“[a]t the same time that it is dismantling its social safety net, the government has intensified its coercive
interventions in poor communities of color” and noting that the government turned toward disruptive
“out-of-home care” as more minority children entered the child welfare system) .
118 See Jason DeParle, The Coronavirus Generation, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/22/sunday-review/coronavirus-poverty-child-allowance.html [https://
perma.cc/D454-F2BW] (“With hunger rising, classrooms closing and parental stress surging, the
pandemic is a threat to low-income children of epochal proportions, one that could leave an entire
generation bearing its scars.”); see also Wendy Ruderman, Philadelphia’s Most Vulnerable Children Suffer
Fallout from COVID-19 Crisis, PHILA. INQUIRER (Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.inquirer.com/
health/coronavirus/coronavirus-covid19-philadelphia-poverty-asthma-adhd-anxiety-20200406.html
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This leaves them at increased risk of facing an investigation.119 At bottom,
today’s CPS practice breeds a lack of trust between communities and the
agency, which “is often perceived as intimidating, incompetent, or both.”120
c. Weak Safeguards in CPS Investigations and Family Court
CPS overenforcement is particularly troublesome when the case proceeds to
family court, where there are significantly fewer protections for parents than
there are for defendants in criminal court.121 This begins with the right to
counsel. In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, the U.S. Supreme Court
declined to find an automatic right to appointed counsel in proceedings to
terminate parental rights.122 But the Court noted that “[a] wise public policy . . .
may require that higher standards be adopted than those minimally tolerable
under the Constitution.”123 Indeed, in New York’s family courts, respondents in
Article 10 abuse and neglect proceedings have a constitutional right to counsel.124
However, the right does attach during the early, investigative stages of the child

[https://perma.cc/8BRU-UFYH] (“For children already on the fringes—living with poverty, health
problems, and special needs—the pandemic has swept them further toward the edge.”).
119 See CITIZENS’ COMM. FOR CHILD. OF N.Y., CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT PREVENTION
DURING COVID-19: PROMOTING CHILD SAFETY AND SUPPORTING FAMILIES (2020),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/media.cccnewyork.org/2021/01/CCC-Brief-Child-Welfare-Prevention-During
-Covid-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/38S3-8FX8] (noting that increased inability to meet children’s needs
because of coronavirus-related “disruptions in employment and pay, growing health concerns and new
barriers to accessing affordable food, maintaining safe and stable housing, and meeting other critical
necessities” may “bring children and their families to the attention of the child welfare system”); see
also, e.g., Bianca Vázquez Toness, Your Child’s a No-Show at Virtual School? You May Get a Call from the
State’s Foster Care Agency, BOS. GLOBE, https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/08/15/metro/your-childsno-show-virtual-school-you-may-get-call-states-foster-care-agency [https://perma.cc/B6TE-QPJN]
(Aug. 15, 2020, 4:07 PM) (reporting on cases in Massachusetts in which school officials made neglect
reports to CPS solely because children failed to log onto their computers for remote instruction, most
frequently in communities of color).
120 See Stewart, supra note 109 (describing eﬀorts by the New York City’s Commissioner of
Child Welfare to improve ACS’ image, including by hiring new caseworkers and investigators,
developing a closer relationship with ACS employees, and advocating against budget cuts).
121 See SAGATUN & EDWARDS, supra note 78, at 108 (“When compared to the due process
aﬀorded to parents in family and juvenile dependency cases, the accused in a criminal proceeding
receives signiﬁcantly more rights before being subject to criminal sanctions.”).
122 452 U.S. 18, 31-32 (1981). The Court acknowledged that the Due Process Clause might
require the appointment of counsel under certain circumstances. Id.
123 Id. at 33.
124 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 261, 262(a)(i) (McKinney 2020) (codifying In re Ella R. B., 285
N.E.2d 288 (N.Y. 1972)). Others have followed suit: forty states and Washington D.C. have created
an “absolute and unqualiﬁed statutory right to counsel” after CPS proceedings begin, four have a
qualiﬁed right, and ﬁve leave the decision to the judge. VIVEK SANKARAN & JOHN POLLOCK, A
NATIONAL SURVEY ON A PARENT’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN STATE-INITIATED DEPENDENCY
AND TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS CASES 1 (2016).
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abuse or neglect case.125 At this stage, uncounseled parental decision-making can
be highly consequential because parents may voluntarily agree to services or
even removal.126 In turn, it is unsurprising that nearly half of child removals in
New York City take place without any prior family court oversight.127 This
stands in contrast to, for example, the judicial involvement in obtaining a
standard search or arrest warrant.128 Similarly, the right to counsel in the
criminal sphere attaches earlier—“upon the commencement of formal
proceedings”129—including plea bargaining before trial.130
Although indigent parents in New York family court have the right to
publicly-funded counsel, the delivery of that right has had “serious
shortcomings” for thirty years and is currently in a state of “crisis.”131 Because
counties coordinate delivery,132 “the caliber of representation received by parents
is largely dependent on the wealth, priorities, and political will of the counties,”
and funding is insufficient.133 Accordingly, while parent representation is a

125 FAM. CT. ACT § 262(a) (providing for counsel in various circumstances following the
initiation of family court proceedings); COMM’N ON PARENTAL LEGAL REPRESENTATION,
INTERIM REPORT TO CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE 16 (2019) [hereinafter INTERIM REPORT] (“[A]
parent’s access to counsel is contingent on the ﬁling of a petition by CPS and the parent’s appearance
in court.”). A family court judge retains the discretionary authority to appoint counsel when
mandated by the New York or federal Constitution. See FAM. CT. ACT § 262(b).
126 See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 125, at 19 (explaining how a family may make signiﬁcant
decisions about the case before having contact with a lawyer); see also FAM. CT. ACT § 1021 (allowing
for removal with a caregiver’s consent).
127 See FAM. CT. ACT § 1024 (authorizing emergency removals); Michael Fitzgerald, Hearings:
Emergency Removals to Foster Care Have Surged in New York. Here’s One Case, CHRON. SOC. CHANGE
(Apr. 24, 2019, 5:48 AM), https://chronicleofsocialchange.org/featured/hearings-emergencyremoval-new-york-city/34685 [https://perma.cc/H884-QHRV] (showing that in 2018, 46.8% of
child removals were emergency removals); cf. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 125, at 18 (stating that
at a hearing in which counsel is unconstitutionally absent, the judge’s decision may “continue an
extrajudicial CPS removal that has already occurred”).
128 See generally N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 690.35 (McKinney 2020) (describing the detailed
components of a search warrant application).
129 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6; People v. West, 615 N.E.2d 968, 970
(N.Y. 1993).
130 See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 34 (1972) (establishing a right to counsel during
the entry of a guilty plea); see also Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 145 (2012) (“[A]s a general rule,
defense counsel has the duty to communicate formal oﬀers from the prosecution to accept a plea on
terms and conditions that may be favorable to the accused.”).
131 See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 125, at 6, 13.
132 See FAM. CT. ACT § 262(c).
133 See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 125, at 24-29, 40-42. This inconsistent delivery reﬂects a
national problem. See Vivek Sankaran, Moving Beyond Lassiter: The Need for a Federal Statutory Right
to Counsel for Parents in Child Welfare Cases, 44 J. LEGIS. 1, 8 (2017) (“Not only does variance exist
among states as to when, or if, counsel must be appointed to represent parents; it also exists as to
the adequacy of that lawyer.”).
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major priority in New York City, anecdotal evidence suggests that upstate
counties fall short of statutory requirements to provide counsel.134
In family court, respondents have access to few of the procedural
safeguards that a criminal defendant is entitled to. This is most clearly
reflected in family court’s “unique statutory and common law rules”
concerning evidence that are “capable of shocking the uninformed
practitioner.”135 A parallel enforcement rationale undergirds these relaxed
rules, as explained by the Court of Appeals: “Because the accused parent is not
subject to criminal sanctions in a child protective proceeding, the Legislature
has provided that the usual rules of criminal evidence do not apply.”136 These
special rules are permissive, allowing for the introduction of evidence that
would be, for example, excluded as hearsay at a criminal trial.137 The family
court may admit “any writing, record, or photograph” created at a hospital or
agency documenting the alleged neglect or abuse, even if the creator of the
evidence is unknown.138 Relatedly, “previous statements made by the child”
are admissible, even if uncorroborated, although the judge cannot make a
finding of abuse or neglect on the basis of uncorroborated evidence alone.139
That being said, “any other evidence tending to support the reliability of
previous statements” may corroborate the child’s testimony.140 Furthermore,
in practice, family court judges may be even more permissive in admitting
evidence than these rules permit. As Professor Vivek Sankaran has noted, this
is because the nature of the disputes in family court—in which judges are
encouraged to solve problems—can foster an informal environment in which
134 See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 125, at 18-22 (detailing issues related to timeliness and
notice in several upstate counties but reﬂecting favorably on innovative practices in New York City
designed to provide parents with a lawyer earlier in the process); see also Lucas A. Gerber, Yuck C.
Pang, Timothy Ross, Martin Guggenheim, Peter J. Pecora & Joel Miller, Eﬀects of an Interdisciplinary
Approach to Parental Representation in Child Welfare, 102 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 42, 52 (2019)
(examining an interdisciplinary approach to parent representation in New York City child welfare
cases and ﬁnding that the model led to reduced stays in foster care and no reductions in child safety).
Additional problems include inconsistent standards used in determining whether parents are truly
indigent (and therefore entitled to a county-funded lawyer), heavy caseloads, and low compensation
rates for court-appointed attorneys. See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 125, at 30-39, 43-44.
135 See Gary Solomon, Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings, in NEW YORK FAMILY COURT
PRACTICE § 2:73 (Merril Sobie ed., 2020).
136 In re Nicole V., 518 N.E.2d 914, 915 (N.Y. 1987); see also Guillermo v. Agramonte, 29
N.Y.S.3d 720, 722 (App. Div. 2016) (“Family Court matters are civil in nature and the Confrontation
Clause applies only to criminal matters . . . .”).
137 See FAM. CT. ACT § 1046(a); accord Merril Sobie, Practice Commentary, McKinney’s
Consol. Laws of N.Y., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1046(a).
138 FAM. CT. ACT § 1046(a)(iv).
139 Id. § 1046(a)(vi).
140 Id.; see also In re Nicole V., 518 N.E.2d at 916 (“Of course, Family Court Judges presented
with the issue have considerable discretion to decide whether the child’s out-of-court statements
describing incidents of abuse or neglect have, in fact, been reliably corroborated and whether the
record as a whole supports a ﬁnding of abuse.”).
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limited, basic safeguards, such as reliance on appellate authority and rules of
evidence, are treated with laxity relative to criminal court.141
This lack of procedural safeguards is striking. Family court proceedings
can seem like criminal trials in that “they pit individuals against the state and
issue moral condemnation of parents.”142 Such proceedings are fundamentally
adversarial,143 and their complexity can leave parents feeling confused and
disempowered.144 This is exacerbated by the open-ended nature of family
court proceedings,145 in which even a disposition is normally “near the
beginning of the court’s involvement” with the family, who will have to return
for numerous hearings to create, modify, or end diﬀerent legal relationships
vis-à-vis the child,146 in contrast to the relative ﬁnality obtained through
criminal sentencing.147 The lack of due process protections in family court is
especially alarming because the outcome of a child protection proceeding can
be far more consequential to a parent than a criminal conviction.148 In
particular, family court’s ultimate remedy—the termination of parental
rights—has been analogized to the “civil death penalty.”149
141 See Vivek Sankaran, Child Welfare Is A System in Need of Umpires, CHRON. SOC. CHANGE
(Aug. 12, 2019, 9:00 PM), https://chronicleofsocialchange.org/child-welfare-2/the-child-welfaresystem-needs-its-judges-to-be-umpires/36871 [https://perma.cc/9MM9-T95U] (“State and federal
statutes provide strong protections for children and their families. But laws are meaningless unless
they are enforced.”). Family court judges have perhaps the greatest leeway when it comes to enforcing
court rules. See N.Y. UNIF. R. FAM. CT. 205.1(b) (enabling a family court judge to suspend any rule
except those governing the structure of the court system if there is “good cause” and it is “in the
interests of justice”); see also Toby Kleinman & Daniel Pollack, Challenges Attorneys Face When Family
Courts Do Not Follow Rules of Evidence, LAW.COM (Oct. 21, 2019, 12:00 PM), https://www.law.com/
newyorklawjournal/2019/10/21/challenges-attorneys-face-when-family-courts-do-not-follow-rules-ofevidence [https://perma.cc/9MM9-T95U] (critiquing such waiver rules as allowing the introduction
of scientifically unsound evidence into dependency proceedings in family court).
142 ROBERTS, supra note 81, at 91.
143 See generally Kathleen A. Bailie, The Other “Neglected” Parties in Child Protective Proceedings:
Parents in Poverty and the Role of the Lawyers Who Represent Them, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2285, 2306,
2306 n.154 (1998) (collecting sources and critiquing an approach in family court that places
apportioning blame over family protection).
144 See Vivek Sankaran, My Name Is Not ‘Respondent Mother’: The Need for Procedural Justice in
Child Welfare Cases, AM. BAR ASS’N CHILD L. PRAC. TODAY (June 6, 2018), https://repository.law.
umich.edu/articles/1992 [https://perma.cc/PA2L-SK2K] (describing in detail the process of family
court proceedings that can leave parents feeling “dejected, hopeless, and angry”).
145 See KRAMER, supra note 52, at 3 (explaining that “[o]nce a case lands in court, allegations
tend to cascade” as other caregiver behaviors come to light).
146 Weisz et al., supra note 52, at 69.
147 See MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 611 (5th ed. 2015)
(explaining that sentencing provides a “bottom line” in criminal adjudication).
148 See Rachel Blustain, New Push to Provide Legal Advice to Parents Facing Abuse and Neglect
Investigations, CITY LIMITS (Jan. 8, 2019), https://citylimits.org/2019/01/08/new-push-to-provide-legaladvice-to-parents-facing-abuse-and-neglect-investigations [https://perma.cc/9W9D-SCNQ] (explaining
that, for some respondents in Bronx Family Court, child custody is more important than personal liberty).
149 See In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Mo. 2004) (en banc) (citing courts in other jurisdictions
that have also employed the analogy). While parent respondents in family court encounter
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CPS has broad authority to investigate child neglect. It often deploys this
authority in communities in which “neglect is usually hard to disentangle
from poverty.”150 The result is extensive state intervention into family life in
which procedural safeguards are missing or unenforced. This practice breeds
distrust between the government and community and harms families. When
the state layers on the coercive power of law enforcement in the neglect area,
it exacerbates these patterns.
2. Endangering the Welfare of a Child
In principle, parallel enforcement in child abuse and neglect cases only
takes place when the conduct investigated by CPS involves a suspected
crime.151 In reality though, New York prosecutors charge the class A
misdemeanor of Endangering the Welfare of a Child (EWC) with
considerable frequency. EWC has two main prongs, mirroring the civil abuse
and neglect standards.152 A person is guilty under the abuse provision when
“he or she knowingly acts in a manner likely to be injurious to the physical,
mental or moral welfare of a child . . . or directs or authorizes such child to
engage in occupation involving substantial risk of danger to his or her life or
health.”153 The second prong applies to parents, guardians, and PLRs who
“fail[] or refuse[] to exercise reasonable diligence in the control of such child
to prevent him or her from becoming an ‘abused child,’ ‘neglected child,’ ‘a
juvenile delinquent,’ or a ‘person in need of supervision.’”154 As the Court of
Appeals has recognized, “[t]he statute is broadly written and imposes a
criminal sanction for the mere ‘likelihood’ of harm.”155
a. Explaining Criminalization
Both the police and district attorney play roles in criminalization. In a
2000 note, Alison B. Vreeland described the “criminalization of child welfare”
in New York City.156 In the 1990s, the New York City Police Department
signiﬁcant diﬃculties, New York family courts have “consistently held that a child cannot be
adjudged dependent if a ﬁt parent is available to care for her.” Angela Greene, The Crab Fisherman
and His Children: A Constitutional Compass for the Non-Oﬀending Parent in Child Protection Cases, 24
ALASKA L. REV. 173, 189-90 (2007) (endorsing New York’s approach with respect to the rights of
nonoﬀending parents); see also, e.g., In re Cheryl K., 484 N.Y.S.2d 476, 477 (Fam. Ct., Kings Cnty.
1985) (stating that a ﬁt parent has a “superior right” to child custody relative to third parties).
150 ROBERTS, supra note 81, at 34.
151 See SHEPPARD & ZANGRILLO, supra note 4, at 4.
152 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10 (McKinney 2020); see also supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text.
153 PENAL § 260.10(1).
154 Id. § 260.10(2).
155 People v. Johnson, 740 N.E.2d 1075, 1076 (N.Y. 2000).
156 Alison B. Vreeland, Note, The Criminalization of Child Welfare in New York City: Sparing the
Child or Spoiling the Family?, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1053, 1053-54 (2000).
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apparently automatically arrested parents in cases in which there was only
evidence of potential child neglect, not abuse.157 These included cases in
which, for example, a mother left her child unsupervised for a brief period of
time, in what is known as a “home alone” case.158 This novel policing practice
represented a departure from the traditional model, in which such low-level
cases fell within the exclusive domain of CPS.159
The pivot toward greater police involvement in this area had three main
causes. First, high-profile child welfare failures where children died or were
seriously harmed have spillover effects beyond CPS.160 Like both CPS and
family court judges, the police, too, have an incentive to pursue these cases as
aggressively as possible, even if that means the de facto adoption of a “must
arrest” policy reminiscent of the domestic violence context.161 Second, and
relatedly, there was a perception in the legal community in the 1990s that law
enforcement was more prepared to “take action” against abuse and neglect,162
perhaps due to the view that police officers are “tougher” than social workers.163

Id. at 1053-54, 1101-03.
See id. at 1054 (describing this type of case); People v. Cenat, 671 N.Y.S.2d 578, 580 (N.Y.C.
Crim. Ct., Kings Cnty. 1997) (“These cases range in severity from infants left unattended for hours
while crack-addicted parents buy drugs, to eleven year old [sic] children left for a brief period while
a single, working parent buys groceries.”); People v. Smith, 678 N.Y.S.2d 872, 875 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct.,
Kings Cnty. 1998) (noting “an increasing number of these so called ‘home alone cases’, appearing in
Criminal Court . . . charged under section one of P.L. § 260.10” and calling on the legislature “to
clearly address the issue of whether it is the legislature’s intent to criminalize the act of leaving
children under a speciﬁed age, home alone for a period of time”).
159 See Vreeland, supra note 156, at 1053 (“Historically, the police have arrested and prosecuted
parents and custodians for child abuse, including sexual abuse. But in cases of suspected neglect, [CPS]
would respond . . . .”); accord ROBERTS, supra note 81, at 77 (“[P]olice are increasingly arresting parents
even for minor instances of neglect that traditionally had been handled by child protective services.”).
160 See Vreeland, supra note 156, at 1054 (“This new policy is, in part, a response to tragic, highproﬁled child abuse cases where a child reported to the child welfare system died at the hands of her
parents.”). For a discussion of the CPS side of this phenomenon, see supra notes 96–99 and
accompanying text.
161 See Vreeland, supra note 156, at 1061 (“There is a growing sentiment that the police have
actually expanded the ‘must arrest’ policy used in domestic violence cases to child welfare matters
as well.”). New York currently requires police oﬃcers to arrest in certain domestic violence
situations, although that statute is set to sunset in September 2021. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 140.10(4) (McKinney 2020); Act of June 30, 1994, ch. 222, § 59, 1994 N.Y. Laws 2704, 2720. See
generally David Hirschel, Eve Buzawa, April Pattavina & Don Faggiani, Domestic Violence and
Mandatory Arrest Laws: To What Extent Do They Influence Police Arrest Decisions?, 98 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 255, 256-57, 292 (2007) (noting the three-decade expansion of mandatory arrest laws
across the United States and concluding that they lead to more arrests).
162 See DEBRA WHITCOMB, WHEN THE VICTIM IS A CHILD 8 (2d ed. 1992) (referring to an
American Bar Association study).
163 See supra notes 61–66 and accompanying text (discussing the perception of police officers involved
in child welfare cases). More contemporary arguments for greater police involvement with CPS include
law enforcement’s capacity to respond to violence and access to databases containing more information
about suspected child abusers. See Murray Weiss, NYPD Could Fix ACS Problems and Save Abused Children’s
157
158
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The final issue relates to resources. As CPS experienced “soaring caseloads” in
that era,164 police were asked to help bear the burden of responding the child
welfare issues.165 Combined, these factors led to, and continue to fuel, law
enforcement intervention in poverty-related neglect cases.
As a result of the push toward criminalization, the number of EWC
charges rose and remains high. Between 1980 and 2017, EWC was one of the
most commonly charged person-related misdemeanors, with the ﬁrst prong
charged a total of 121,790 times and the second prong charged 11,014 times.166
Over one six-month span in 2017, EWC was charged 505 times in New York
City.167 This represented a decrease in charging at a rate faster than for similar
misdemeanors over the prior four years, although this drop had all but ceased
by 2017.168 In general, this pattern accords with the sharp statewide decrease
in arrests for person-related misdemeanors in the past decade.169
b. Blurred Lines Between Criminal and Family Court
While technically belonging to a separate system, EWC complements
CPS’ enforcement regime. When deciding to bring an EWC charge,
prosecutors maintain their traditionally broad discretion.170 That is to say, an
earlier adverse ﬁnding resulting from a family court proceeding does not

Lives, Experts Say, DNAINFO (Feb. 10, 2017, 9:46 AM), https://www.dnainfo.com/newyork/20170210/civic-center/nypd-administration-for-childrens-services [https://perma.cc/8QK5-QLZM].
164 WHITCOMB, supra note 162, at 8.
165 See Weiss, supra note 163.
166 MEREDITH PATTEN, QUINN O. HOOD, CECILIA LOW-WEINER, OLIVE LU, ERICA BOND,
DAVID HATTEN & PREETI CHAUHAN, MISDEMEANOR JUST. PROJECT, TRENDS IN MISDEMEANOR
ARRESTS IN NEW YORK 93 tbl.33 (2018). Section 260.10(1) charges represented 1.8% of person-related
misdemeanors in New York City, 3.2% in upstate cities, and 7.7% in the rest of the state. Id. For
§ 260.10(2), these figures were 0.3%, 0.7%, and 0.5%, respectively. Id. There is one additional set of data
in the report related to § 260.10 charges without further specification. See id. at 94 tbl.33.
167 Jarrett Murphy, Data Drop: Misdemeanor Arrests in New York City, 2013-2017, CITY LIMITS
(Oct. 17, 2017), https://citylimits.org/2017/10/17/data-drop-misdemeanor-arrests-in-new-york-city2013-2017 [https://perma.cc/9ZQE-8AJ8].
168 See id. (showing a 23.37% decline in EWC charges over a six-month period compared to the
previous four years, compared with smaller declines for Assault in the Third Degree (12.78%), Menacing
in the Second Degree (6.18%), Aggravated Harassment in the Second Degree (20.34%), and Reckless
Endangerment in the Second Degree (16.27%)). But see id. (showing a 1.78% decline in EWC charges
over a six-month period compared only to the previous year, compared with declines for Assault in the
Third Degree (8.50%), Menacing in the Second Degree (2.13%), Aggravated Harassment in the Second
Degree (1.70%), and Reckless Endangerment in the Second Degree (11.54%)).
169 See PATTEN ET AL., supra note 166, at 42 ﬁgs.34-36 (showing declines in person-related
oﬀenses in New York City, upstate cities, and the rest of the state starting around the year 2012).
170 See generally MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 147, at 146 (stating that local prosecutor’s
“complete discretion to refuse to ﬁle charges or to dismiss charges after they had been ﬁled” is today
“the dominant position for most crimes in almost all jurisdictions”).

896

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 169: 867

block the commencement of a criminal case.171 A parallel enforcement
framework highlights the diﬀerences between the two systems, as explained
by one criminal court in Manhattan:
[T]he Family Court serves a function very diﬀerent from that of the Criminal
Court. A child protective proceeding is civil in nature. Its purpose is to
protect children from injury or mistreatment, safeguard their physical,
mental, and emotional well-being, and insure the parent’s right to due process
of law. In contrast, the function of the criminal justice system is not just
protection, but deterrence, rehabilitation and retribution. It provides an
appropriate public response to the particular oﬀense committed. The entry
of a Family Court dispositional order, protective and rehabilitative in nature,
does not serve the legitimate and necessary function of seeing that criminal
behavior is both punished and deterred. Such a distinction requires the
continuation of the penal process.172

The supposedly parallel nature of the proceedings may additionally require
parents facing proceedings in both systems to choose which rights to stand on.
Charging EWC enhances CPS enforcement. There is no right to remain
silent in a CPS investigation.173 Caseworkers (sometimes accompanied by the
police) may ask a party under CPS investigation questions about arrests and
the criminal case, even if a lawyer has already been assigned to that party as
a defendant in criminal court, and may subsequently share that information
with law enforcement.174 Testifying in family court risks broadening criminal
liability, because self-incriminating testimony oﬀered in family court may

171 New York courts, including the Court of Appeals, have explicitly endorsed this position. See
People v. Roselle, 643 N.E.2d 72, 76 (N.Y. 1994) (“[N]o legally cognizable identity of issues exists
between the child protective proceeding, which seeks to safeguard the child, and a criminal action,
which yields a final determination conclusive of defendant’s penal responsibility . . . .”); People v.
Daniels, 598 N.Y.S.2d 790, 791 (App. Div. 1993) (stating that there was no double jeopardy bar to
criminal prosecution for sodomy following a family court proceeding because of the latter’s civil
nature); People v. Berrios, 610 N.Y.S.2d 748, 749-50 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct., New York Cnty. 1994) (denying
defendants’ motion for a dismissal of an EWC complaint “in furtherance of justice” after a family court
proceeding had resulted in a finding a physical abuse and removal of the child victim from the home).
172 Berrios, 610 N.Y.S.2d at 751 (citations omitted).
173 See CIV. ACTION PRAC. OF THE BRONX DEFS., supra note 70, at 40 (“Criminal
practitioners must understand that—despite being represented by counsel in criminal court or
beyond—there is no legally recognized prohibition on municipal child protective workers’ ability to
question your clients fully about the circumstances of their arrests, the allegations, or the criminal
charges.”) (emphasis omitted).
174 See id. at 40-41 (“[Clients] will be asked to make admissions about every detail concerning
their criminal cases and will often make admissions that can later be used against them in their
criminal cases.”); see also Cook, supra note 25, at 366 (noting that information obtained from Texas
CPS may come within the purview of the Fifth Amendment, but that this hinges on how the CPS
agent is categorized).
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later be used at a criminal trial.175 At the same time, because the family court
proceeding is a civil one, the court may interpret silence as a basis for making
an adverse inference against the respondent, thereby diminishing the chances
for a favorable outcome in the abuse and neglect proceeding.176 In this “world
where parallel lines converge,” Professor William Wesley Patton has criticized
a system in which parents seeking family reuniﬁcation at either a factﬁnding
hearing or as a result of the disposition of the civil proceeding may be
required to inculpate themselves and thereby face the “threat of criminal
reprisal.”177 Finally, when criminal charges stem from the same conduct that
leads CPS to start a family court case, a conviction in criminal court could
result, depending on how the record is developed, in the family court granting
summary judgment to the state on the abuse or neglect petition.178
Although EWC is a misdemeanor, successful prosecution can be highly
consequential. First, as a class A misdemeanor, EWC carries a maximum
sentence of 364 days in jail.179 As such, conviction in criminal court may result
in the separation of a parent from her child even in the absence of an abuse or
neglect finding in family court; indeed, in 2013, the Children’s Bureau of the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services conservatively estimated
that 19,858 children entered foster care because of parental incarceration (not
necessarily related to child abuse or neglect).180 Second, in the more likely
175 See, e.g., In re Emily I., 854 N.Y.S.2d 792, 793 (App. Div. 2008) (“It is within the discretion
of Family Court whether to permit an abuse petition to proceed despite the pendency of a criminal
action against the respondent and the concomitant chilling eﬀect the pending criminal action may
have on the respondent’s decision whether to testify in the abuse proceeding . . . .”); see also
Solomon, supra note 135, § 2:35 (surveying cases and noting that the state criminal appellate courts
have been consistent in rejecting defendants’ claims that concurrent family court proceedings should
not continue until the completion of the criminal case).
176 See Comm’r of Soc. Servs. v. Philip De G., 450 N.E.2d 681, 683 (N.Y. 1983) (“[I]t is now
established that in civil proceedings an inference may be drawn against the witness because of his
failure to testify . . . .”).
177 Patton, supra note 25, at 473, 475-76, 523-24.
178 See, e.g., In re Lilliana K., 107 N.Y.S.3d 462, 463-64 (App. Div. 2019) (affirming family court’s
grant of summary judgment for CPS in an Article 10 proceeding following an EWC conviction
because “the identical issue” was already litigated in criminal court and the respondent “had a full and
fair opportunity to litigate” the criminal matter); In re Denise “GG”, 678 N.Y.S.2d 821, 822 (App. Div.
1998) (affirming the application of collateral estoppel in family court after the respondent had already
pleaded guilty in the criminal case to crimes stemming from the same underlying conduct); accord
CIV. ACTION PRAC. OF THE BRONX DEFS., supra note 70, at 43 (“If the allegations in the criminal
case are the same as those in the Family Court case, remember that a guilty plea, depending on the
allocution, could mean an automatic finding of neglect or abuse in criminal court.”).
179 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.15(1) (McKinney 2020).
180 CHILD.’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., CHILD WELFARE
PRACTICE WITH FAMILIES AFFECTED BY PARENTAL INCARCERATION 3 (2015). Nationally,
parents facing longer periods of time in prison risk the termination of parental rights even absent a
ﬁnding of child abuse and neglect because “AFSA requires States to ﬁle for the termination of the
parental rights for any child who has been abandoned or in foster care for 15 of the most recent 22
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scenario that a parent does not spend time in jail, the record of an arrest or
conviction for EWC will carry collateral consequences for the parent,
including the potential loss of or ineligibility for employment.181 These
consequences threaten to exacerbate the underlying poverty that led to a
conviction for neglect in the first place, and thereby make future interaction
with the child welfare system more likely.182 Finally, law enforcement
involvement will implicate CPS. When a defendant is charged with EWC or
“any crime that may have put her children at risk,” a CPS investigation or
petition in family court is “likely” to follow (if one does not already exist).183
c. Separate but Not Apart
The use of EWC problematizes the idea of parallel enforcement. For one,
the state is willing to invoke a parallel enforcement rationale when justifying
the involvement of two systems. In turn, it may use Article 10 (CPS) and
EWC (law enforcement) to produce compounding penalties for the same
conduct. Perhaps more troublesome is the use of parallel enforcement to give
the government two bites at the apple, allowing it to use one system as a
fallback should it be initially unsuccessful in either one. However, upon closer
investigation, one sees that the systems do not function as separately as the
legal rationale for their dual existence suggests they would.
At the heart of parallel enforcement is the concept of separateness.
Fundamentally, because the systems are separate, the state may pursue two
cases, one civil and one criminal. Ironically, though, a rationale predicated on
separateness simultaneously provides a legal basis for crossover between the
systems on the ground. The sharing and borrowing of investigative resources,
months.” Id. at 4; cf. Eli Hager & Anna Flagg, How Incarcerated Parents Are Losing Their Children
Forever, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Dec. 2, 2018, 10:00 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/
2018/12/03/how-incarcerated-parents-are-losing-their-children-forever [https://perma.cc/DX3A-7CLC]
(“[A]t least 32,000 incarcerated parents since 2006 had their children permanently taken from them
without being accused of physical or sexual abuse, though other factors, often related to their
poverty, may have been involved.”). Professor Roberts also observes how AFSA’s encouragement of
child adoption further “weakens the chances of family preservation.” See Roberts, supra note 117, at
1498-99. New York provides an exception to AFSA’s 15/22 requirement for incarcerated parents. See
N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 384-B(3)(l)(i)(D) (McKinney 2020); accord CHILD.’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T
OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra, at 4.
181 See CIV. ACTION PRAC. OF THE BRONX DEFS., supra note 70, at 30-38 (describing wideranging employment consequences following an arrest and/or conviction in New York).
182 See ROBERTS, supra note 81, at 181-82 (describing the overlap of families receiving welfare
and families involved with the child welfare system); see also Vreeland, supra note 156, at 1084
(“[P]arents who face poverty will be less likely to reach out and ask for assistance and services if
they feel that drawing attention to themselves will leave them vulnerable to arrest.”).
183 CIV. ACTION PRAC. OF THE BRONX DEFS., supra note 70, at 39. Additional circumstances
unrelated to EWC but that relate to any other criminal activity involving a parent (e.g., if a child was in
the home at the same time the parent engaged in a crime) can also trigger a CPS investigation. Id. at 42.
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evidence, and even judgments render the high-level distinctions between the
two systems academic. Critically, these practices are not a betrayal of parallel
enforcement, but a product of the idea “two systems.” For example, a prosecutor
could not use an EWC conviction to obtain a subsequent criminal conviction,
but by taking that result into the nominally civil family court, the government
may altogether preclude the respondent from challenging CPS’ case.184
The end effect is that the systems frequently work hand in hand to achieve
similar goals, including the temporary, long-term, or permanent removal of the
child from the parent. As such, while the day-to-day work of CPS and the
police may result in conflict due to different philosophical underpinnings
(among other factors), the legal regimes of family law and criminal law each
become more coercive in the child welfare setting when they are allowed to rely
on one another. Thus, while system clash can have a negative effect on child
welfare, the risk to children may indeed be greater when the two work closely
together, at least when it comes to the pursuit of poverty-related neglect cases.
3. A Return to CPS
What is now needed is a clearer deﬁnition of roles for each system based
on their respective responsibilities and competencies. Simply put, this degree
of state power is unnecessary in responding to child neglect. Twenty years
ago, Vreeland argued that CPS and the family court were best suited to
“address the problem of neglect because under the child protection system,
the child’s constitutional right to the parent-child relationship is best
considered and protected.”185 In principle, this conclusion is true: where the
child welfare system is governed by statutes explicitly concerned with the
“best interests of the child,” law enforcement has its own set of priorities.186
Another factor to consider is that CPS possesses a wider range of tools to
address the underlying causes of poverty that often lead to enforcement
actions in one or both systems.187 This is especially true for preventative
184 See supra note 178 and accompanying text (providing examples of how the criminal court
judgement may preclude a parent’s defense in family court).
185 Vreeland, supra note 156, at 1097.
186 See supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text (summarizing the relevant legal authority on
family reuniﬁcation standards).
187 In addition to safety plans concluded outside of family court, CPS has other less coercive
methods at its disposal. For example, local child welfare agencies are authorized to create a second
track of enforcement, or “diﬀerential response program.” See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 427-A(1)
(McKinney 2020). The purpose of this additional track—called the “Family Assessment Response”
(FAR)—is to serve “as an alternative means of addressing certain matters otherwise investigated as
allegations of child abuse or maltreatment.” Id. FAR is explicitly designed for low-level cases (i.e.,
allegations of sexual, physical, or severe or repeated abuse are excluded) and for situations in which
the child is not in an unsafe situation. See id. §§ 427-A(3)(a), (4)(c)(ii). FAR is designed to be a
more cooperative and “ﬂexible” response to problems within the family; as such, “[f]amilies are
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services, such as parenting skills courses, which the district attorney or
criminal court are only able to mandate after conviction.188 A renewed focus
on preventative services by CPS in neglect cases would reduce both the
individual and systemic consequences associated with overenforcement and
also better align New York with prevailing federal policy. In particular, the
recently passed Family First Prevention Services Act,189 in the words of two
commentators, “aims to prevent children from entering foster care by
allowing federal reimbursement for mental health services, substance use
treatment, and in-home parenting skill training.”190 The law does this by
redirecting most Social Security Act Title IV-E funds away from foster care
and toward these three large buckets of preventative services.191
Returning neglect cases to CPS’ domain will require some significant
changes to the current parallel enforcement regime. Vreeland’s proposal to have
CPS and family court “address the problem of neglect” still preserves a
prominent role for law enforcement, as she writes: “Law enforcement should
certainly play a role because child endangerment is a crime.”192 But the fact that
a pattern of neglect might technically fit into the broad statutory EWC
definition193 ought not to be considered a compelling reason to deploy the
coercive force of law enforcement in dealing with such cases—with potentially
severe collateral consequences—when CPS and family court are better equipped
to deal with the underlying problem (or in cases in which reunification is not
feasible, to move toward removal or the termination of parental rights).

treated as partners and are approached in a solution focused manner, such as calling parents to
arrange a time to meet with the family instead of making an unannounced home visit.” CPS
MANUAL, supra note 15, at ch. 5 A-1. Since FAR seeks to connect families with services, “[t]here is
no formal determination of whether child maltreatment occurred.” Id.
188 See, e.g., People v. Muhammad, No. 2005QN060622, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4097, at *1
(N.Y.C. Crim. Ct., Queens Cnty. June 8, 2006) (showing that after having been charged with EWC
and other charges related to physical abuse and pleading guilty to a diﬀerent charge, the defendant
was sentenced to a parenting skills course). An exception to this rule is the possibility of pretrial
diversion to a program like parenting skills, in which case a criminal disposition is not reached. See
generally MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 147, at 149 (explaining that the prosecutor will decline to
ﬁle or drop charges after the criminal defendant completes the diversion program).
189 See Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-123, §§ 50701-50782, 132 Stat. 64, 232-68.
190 Kristen Torres & Rricha Mathur, Fact Sheet: Family First Prevention Services Act, FIRST
FOCUS: CAMPAIGN FOR CHILD. (Mar. 9, 2018), https://campaignforchildren.org/resources/factsheet/fact-sheet-family-ﬁrst-prevention-services-act [https://perma.cc/E7AH-EYBS].
191 Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 § 50711; see also Fabiola Villalpando, Legislative Update, Family
First Prevention Services Act: An Overhaul of National Child Welfare Policies, 39 CHILD.’S LEGAL RTS. J.
283, 283-85 (2019). But see id. at 285-86 (summarizing some early concerns with the law).
192 Vreeland, supra note 156, at 1097.
193 See People v. Johnson, 740 N.E.2d 1075, 1076 (N.Y. 2000) (recognizing the breadth of the
EWC statute).
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Vreeland does not object to the continued involvement of law
enforcement at the investigation stage.194 Rather, the author argues that
social workers should be included in criminal investigations of child neglect
to make sure that the child is considered at all stages. Police and caseworkers
together conduct a thorough investigation. Caseworkers often employ the
assistance of police when making home visits or removing children in order
to ensure the safety of everyone involved.195

In sum, Vreeland believes that “[t]he problem is what happens after the
arrest.”196 However, the criminalization of child welfare is indeed a problem
well before the arrest stage, as families come to view CPS as a form of policelite, thereby cutting them oﬀ from the anti-poverty resources they need.197
Nor are parents under CPS investigation incorrect in their cognitive blending
of CPS and law enforcement. While the case law in New York appears to fully
embrace the logic of parallel enforcement in justifying the involvement of
two often-duplicative systems, the practical reality is that the two often
combine resources to strengthen each other and achieve more aggressive
punishments against parents in one or both forums.198
Some cases of neglect should remain in the criminal system, but in
instances in which there is no actual harm to the child or the harm is a product
of the caregiver’s poverty, separation of the systems is appropriate. Vreeland’s
proposal maintains the troublesome mixing of the agencies’ roles in these
cases.199 In short, “mak[ing] sure that the child is considered at all stages”200
would often mean not pursuing the prototypical home alone-type criminal
neglect case in the ﬁrst place. Neglect cases should be almost exclusively
pursued by CPS, which is better suited to oﬀer preventative services, work
with families, and seek more targeted remedies in family court if necessary.201
Vreeland, supra note 156, at 1097.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 115–17 and accompanying text (explaining how caregivers may avoid contact
with doctors and teachers and how children are cut oﬀ from potential channels of support).
198 See supra subsection II.A.2.c (explaining how the two legal regimes combine to strengthen
each other).
199 See Vreeland, supra note 156, at 1097 (explaining the desirability of law enforcement working
with CPS and observing that CPS often calls upon law enforcement for assistance).
200 Id.
201 See, e.g., CASEY FAM. PROGRAMS, ASSESSMENT OF NEW YORK CITY ADMINISTRATION
FOR CHILDREN’S SERVICES SAFETY PRACTICE AND INITIATIVES 12-15 (2017) (describing New
York City ACS as a “national leader in investing in the continuum of preventative services and
supports” through a wide range of diﬀerent programs and concluding that child maltreatment is
reduced during and after family participation in these programs); see also id. at 22 (noting that New
York State has also “made signiﬁcant and sustained investments in preventative services over the
past two decades” which have contributed to a decline in the number of children in foster care).
194
195
196
197

902

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 169: 867

Criminal prosecution is a powerful but blunt instrument, and it would be
more eﬀective for law enforcement to deploy it toward a more pressing
societal issue: child abuse.
B. Underenforcement in Abuse Cases
Although prosecuting EWC in the neglect context may compound the
eﬀects of an aggressive child welfare system, prosecuting crimes against
children does play a key role in protecting child welfare. However, the
government’s enforcement capacity is limited in the more serious cases of
physical or sexual abuse, where the state cannot fully defend the rights of the
child victim because the child’s nonoﬀending caregiver often holds a de facto
veto over the prosecution of the defendant. By refusing to work with law
enforcement, the nonoﬀending caregiver may eﬀectively end the case against
the abuser, who remains free to continue the abuse of the child.
In this Part, I argue that the source of this noncooperation is often
misunderstood; rather than categorically representing bad parenting, it may
also be a byproduct of the unclear boundaries between law enforcement and
CPS. By reframing and appreciating the concerns of the nonoﬀending
caregiver, the prosecutor may be able to develop a working relationship with
the victim and caregiver, increasing the likelihood of a successful prosecution.
Critically, obtaining the nonoﬀending caregiver’s cooperation will require the
government to wall oﬀ law enforcement from CPS in certain instances,
providing certainty where it has thus far remained elusive.
1. Taking Child Abuse Seriously
The prosecution of child abuse is an essential function for a district attorney.
First, child abuse remains a serious problem in New York and nationally.202 In
particular, the ongoing coronavirus pandemic has raised concerns that, with
families locked inside their homes, child abuse is both becoming more severe
and less frequently reported.203 As such, deploying the coercive power of the
202 See CHILD MALTREATMENT 2018, supra note 94, at 40 tbl.3-8 (showing that in New York
in FFY 2018, there were 570 unique child victims of physical abuse only, but 27,546 unique child
victims of multiple forms of maltreatment, including medical neglect, neglect, psychological
maltreatment, and sexual abuse).
203 Nikita Stewart, Child Abuse Cases Drop 51 Percent. The Authorities Are Very Worried., N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/09/nyregion/coronavirus-nyc-child-abuse.html
[https://perma.cc/5BZ7-97K7] (Aug. 7, 2020) (explaining that pandemic-related lockdowns designed
to protect health and safety have the perverse effect of locking at-risk children into unsafe homes);
see also Samantha Schmidt & Hannah Natanson, With Kids Stuck at Home, ER Doctors See More Severe
Cases of Child Abuse, WASH. POST (Apr. 30, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
education/2020/04/30/child-abuse-reports-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/J8KE-9754] (explaining
that the cases that do end up on the authorities’ radar involve more serious cases of physical abuse
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state to prosecute crimes against children may deter child abuse and send a
powerful signal about how society expects adults to treat children and protect
their “physical health, morals and well-being.”204 Second, law enforcement has
greater legal reach than CPS because CPS’ authority is generally limited to the
family setting.205 As such, CPS plays a role in extra-familial matters only when
it is pursuing a case against a parent or PLR on a theory of derivative neglect.206
When it comes to responding to these more severe cases, only law enforcement
can vindicate the rights of the child victim and ought not tolerate a nonoffending
parent’s interference with the investigation.
a. The Case of the Child Victim
Prosecuting EWC against a non-family member is hugely challenging
because it requires (1) sensitivity towards the unique needs of the child victim,
(2) navigating evidentiary diﬃculties, particularly those related to the child’s
testimony, and, critically, (3) the cooperation of the child’s caregiver. These
related issues make meeting the legal standard of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt very diﬃcult, and as a result, the district attorney may decline to
prosecute the case.207 Nevertheless, in pursuing cases against non-family

requiring hospitalization); Julia Ingram, Has Child Abuse Surged Under COVID-19? Despite Alarming
Stories from ERs, There’s No Answer, NBC NEWS (July 27, 2020, 11:24 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/health/kids-health/has-child-abuse-surged-under-covid-19-despite-alarmingstories-n1234713 [https://perma.cc/7JH5-Z7AE] (surveying forty-four jurisdictions and finding an
average 40.6% decrease in reports from April 2019 to April 2020). The crisis has similarly made it
more difficult for CPS workers to carry out routine tasks, directly jeopardizing the safety of at-risk
children. See Garrett Therolf, Daniel Lempres & Aksaule Alzhan, They’re Children at Risk of Abuse,
and Their Caseworkers Are Stuck at Home, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/08/07/us/virus-child-abuse.html [https://perma.cc/EWB9-V2HY] (explaining that caseworkers
“have stopped performing a broad range of essential duties” because of virus fears). Due to the lack
of reporting, there is also concern that speculation about increases in child abuse will result in heavier
intervention into families in marginalized communities. See Hager, supra note 96 (explaining the fear
of some experts that “hypothesizing” about unreported increases in child abuse will lead to more
punitive actions against poor families of color).
204 See People v. Bergerson, 218 N.E.2d 288, 289 (N.Y. 1966) (explaining the purpose of the EWC
statute in its former form, which is very similar to the current EWC statute); People v. Berrios, 610
N.Y.S.2d 748, 751 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct., New York Cnty. 1994) (“In contrast [to Family Court], the function
of the criminal justice system is not just protection, but deterrence, rehabilitation and retribution.”);
People v. Doe, 521 N.Y.S.2d 636, 638 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct., New York Cnty. 1987) (“[T]he role of the court
as a protector of young children . . . [is] a role as essential as protecting the rights of the accused.”).
205 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
206 See infra notes 242–43 and accompanying text.
207 See INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 59 (“On the criminal side, charges
are not filed in many cases, even when prosecutors may believe a crime occurred, because of difficulties
entailed in proving the case and in meeting the legal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
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members, law enforcement can eﬀectively target a small but signiﬁcant
minority of all child abuse cases brought into the criminal system.208
That prosecutors need to work closely with children who have been
victimized implicates a special set of considerations. First, children are
particularly vulnerable members of society and possess limited autonomy.209
A child’s victimization may have consequences of diﬀerent severities, ranging
from experiencing feelings of guilt to behaving violently.210 Second and
relatedly, the need to give testimony several times can have long-term,
traumatizing eﬀects on the child victim.211 This concern is elevated when the
child knows and has come to trust the defendant, who may live or interact
regularly with the child (even if the two are not legally-recognized family
members).212 Likewise, the child victim is understandably nervous and
worried; while the CAC might be designed for a child, a prosecutor’s oﬃce
or criminal court is a stressful environment.213 Third, the child’s cognitive
capacity, deﬁned by factors such as a “limited understanding of space,
distance, and time,” short attention span, or discomfort with strangers, is
“common[ly]” limited and may impede the victim’s ability to provide the
prosecutor with information that can be used in a formal proceeding.214 These
issues may magnify the scope of the prosecutor’s next major hurdle: evidence.
The evidentiary issues in a child abuse prosecution are manifold, and the
challenges often begin with the child’s testimony.215 In New York, children
aged nine and older are presumptively permitted to be able to testify under
oath; for younger children, “the court [must be] satisﬁed that he or she
208 In FFY 2018, 13.4% of child victims were abused or neglected by a nonparent. These
included other relatives (4.7% of all perpetrators) and a parent’s unmarried partner (2.8%). CHILD
MALTREATMENT 2018, supra note 94, at 22.
209 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
210 See WHITCOMB, supra note 162, at 18-19 (giving examples of behavior that children exhibit
as a reaction to victimization).
211 This was a major factor behind the creation of MDTs and CACs. See How the CAC Model
Works, supra note 27 (discussing the desire to avoid re-traumatization of children during investigations).
212 See Catherine Tinker, Child Abuse: A Practitioner’s Guide to the Trial of Child Abuse Cases in
Criminal Court, 4 NYLS J. HUM. RTS. 55, 61 (1986) (“The potential for damage to a delicate and
already wounded child is tremendous, and may increase each time the child is forced to repeat his
or her story about how a loved adult abused him or her.”).
213 See id. at 62-63; see also WHITCOMB, supra note 162, at 18 (recounting a story in a which a
child witness revealed to a therapist that she feared the judge would hit her with the gavel, which
the child described as a “hammer”).
214 See WHITCOMB, supra note 162, at 16 (listing additional factors related to a child’s cognitive
capacity including an illogical organization of thoughts or “complex understanding of truth and
lying”). As the author explains, while some of these issues may dissipate in older age groups, new
issues related to cognitive capacity might emerge, such as children using their expanded vocabulary
in imprecise ways. Id.
215 See Theodore P. Cross & Debra Whitcomb, The Practice of Prosecuting Child Maltreatment:
Results of an Online Survey of Prosecutors, 69 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 20, 20 (2017) (“[S]o much
of the eﬀort to prove abuse in court rests on the child’s testimony.”).
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understands the nature of an oath.”216 In order to proceed with a case based
on the testimony of a child younger than nine, then, a diligent prosecutor
must make an assessment of the child victim’s capacity to give testimony, a
challenge the defendant will inevitably raise in a pretrial motion.217 The
prosecutor usually attempts to safeguard the case against future challenges to
the child’s capacity to swear an oath by conducting a recorded voir dire of the
child (before the child witness signs the supporting deposition) and
personally signing an aﬃdavit attesting to the child’s capacity, both of which
can later be presented to the court and defense.218 If the prosecutor
determines and the judge agrees that the child witness can swear an oath, the
child will be able to give testimony like any other competent adult witness;219
if the child witness cannot swear an oath under the relevant statutory
requirement, then the prosecutor must rely upon other witnesses, who might
not even exist, in order to advance the case—a considerably more diﬃcult, if
not impossible, task. After all, “[t]he testimony of the child victim of abuse
will be the only direct evidence in most child abuse trials.”220

216 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.20(2) (McKinney 2020). The so-called “swearability” of a
child witness is an issue long before the prosecutor even considers taking a case to trial. In New
York, the hearsay components of a misdemeanor complaint (such as one charging EWC) must be
“converted” into an “information,” which formally charges the oﬀense. See id. § 100.10(1); People v.
Soler, 544 N.Y.S.2d 287, 288-90 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct., Kings Cnty. 1989). To achieve conversion, the
prosecutor may verify the complaint in any number of ways—all of which rely upon the witness
swearing an oath—including obtaining a signed supporting deposition which informs the witness of
the risk of committing perjury. CRIM. PROC. § 100.30. After initiating the action, the prosecutor
has a strictly enforced ninety-day window to convert the complaint. Id. § 30.30(1)(b); see e.g., People
v. Akramov, 124 N.Y.S.3d 639, 640-41 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct., Kings Cnty. Mar. 3, 2020) (demonstrating
how a criminal court will calculate the number of days used by the government in preparing for trial
and dismissing the charges after ninety-ﬁve “chargeable” days elapsed). Speedy trial motions
pursuant to section 30.30 often represent the formal basis upon which the judge will dismiss a case
on the basis of a missing “jurisdictionally suﬃcient accusatory instrument.” See, e.g., People v.
Seward, 662 N.Y.S.2d 731, 732 (Mount Vernon, N.Y. City Ct. 1997).
217 The district attorney is not legally mandated to make such a determination, but without
doing so, leaves the case vulnerable to a defendant’s motion to dismiss if the child’s testimony is
needed to make out the prima facie case. See People v. Phillipe, 538 N.Y.S.2d 400, 406 (N.Y.C. Crim.
Ct., Kings Cnty. 1989) (“[S]everal recent cases have fashioned unique but differing verification
requirements for child witnesses. Each case requires an examination of the child witness not explicitly
required by the verification statute, in order to complete or perfect the act of verification. Their varied
approaches have caused some confusion . . . especially among prosecutors.”) (citations omitted).
218 See Soler, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 290 (prescribing this procedure involving a recorded voir dire and
affidavit from the prosecutor); see also People v. Richard, 929 N.Y.S.2d 723, 728 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct., Kings
Cnty. 2011) (“For many years, courts have accepted the procedure described in Soler since ‘(t)his method
satisfies due process and sufficiently protects Defendant’s rights because the Court, and not the
prosecutor, determine [sic] whether the Witness is able to swear to the Complaint.’”) (citation omitted).
219 See Tinker, supra note 212, at 68 (“The testimony of any child who is found to be capable of
taking the oath by a judge shall be given the same weight as the testimony of any adult witness.”).
220 Id. at 76.
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Recognizing the diﬃculties associated with children’s testimony,
legislators around the country attempted to introduce measures to make it
easier for child witnesses to give testimony.221 Depending on the state,
children were allowed to testify via closed-circuit television, courtroom
audiences could be limited, and new hearsay exceptions to the introduction
of the child’s out-of-court statements came into force.222 In 1985, New York
passed an experimental law, which remains on the books today, that allows
the district attorney to move to have the child witnesses declared
“vulnerable,” in which the judge must determine “that it is likely that such
child witness will suﬀer serious mental or emotional harm if required to
testify at a criminal proceeding without the use of live, two-way closed-circuit
television” in the context of sex crimes.223
Subsequently, the U.S. Supreme Court limited the states’ ability to employ
these accommodation tools.224 In particular, the Court’s 2004 decision in
Crawford v. Washington generally prohibited the use of out-of-court testimonial
statements at trial if the witness is unavailable.225 This has directly implicated
221 See Cross & Whitcomb, supra note 215, at 21 (describing protective measures enacted by
legislatures “intended to support and protect child victims who testify in court”).
222 Id. Evidence from the around the country suggests that these measures are rarely used in
practice. Id.
223 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 65.10(1) (McKinney 2020); accord id. § 65.00(1) (deﬁning the
relevant sex crimes); see also People v. Cintron, 551 N.E.2d 561, 564 (N.Y. 1990) (interpreting a
stricter, older version of the statute governing the use of “live two-way closed-circuit television in
sex crime cases” involving a child witness and aﬃrming its facial validity under certain narrow
circumstances). The experimental law sunsets in September 2021. See Act of July 24, 1985, ch. 505,
§ 5, 1985 N.Y. Laws 2570, 2574.
224 See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1020-21 (1988) (Scalia, J.) (holding that the placement of a
screen between a defendant and child witnesses violated the Confrontation Clause but leaving open
the possibility that certain exceptions to the requirement that the defendant must be permitted to
literally face the witness could exist). But cf. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 851-57 (1990)
(O’Connor, J.) (holding that the use of one-way closed-circuit television that prevents the witness
from seeing the defendant is permitted if it “further[s] an important state interest,” but that there
must be more than a de minimis showing that the child would suffer emotional distress as a result of
being around the defendant). For a conclusion that the need to balance child protection against the
rights of the accused “has lowered the feasibility of introducing innovative practices in the courtroom,”
see generally Ashley Fansher & Rolando V. del Carmen, “The Child as Witness”: Evaluating State
Statutes on the Court’s Most Vulnerable Population, 36 CHILD.’S LEGAL RTS. J. 1, 2 (2016).
225 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50-54 (2004) (Scalia, J.). If a court determines as a
threshold matter that the child’s statements are not testimonial, then Crawford will not bar the
admission of such a statement. In Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173 (2015), the Court distinguished Crawford
on the basis that the child victim identified his mother’s boyfriend as the perpetrator to his preschool
teachers, not the police, after his teachers discovered injuries on the child. Id. at 2180-82. In its
evaluation of the relevant circumstances surrounding the child’s disclosure, the Court noted that
“[s]tatements by very young children will rarely, if ever, implicate the Confrontation Clause.” Id. at
2182. Children’s nontestimonial hearsay may still come into evidence on the basis of recognized hearsay
exceptions. See id. at 2178, 2182 (concluding that the Sixth Amendment did not bar the admission of
the child victim’s statements by the trial court, which had applied an Ohio statute allowing for the
admission of hearsay by child victims); People v. Hernandez, 65 N.E.3d 1272, 1273 (N.Y. 2016) (allowing
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the use of MDTs and CACs, since a structured interview with the child victim
is considered testimonial; as such, in order for the government to use that
evidence at trial, Crawford demands that the child be present.226 As Professor
Myrna Raeder explains, “[p]ost-Crawford, if a child does not testify, the chances
of winning at trial plummet because significant types of child hearsay will be
eliminated.”227 More fundamentally, in cases in which the child cannot or will
not testify, prosecutors are unlikely to even pursue cases in which they would
have formerly been able to rely on child hearsay.228 As two commentators have
noted, the post-Crawford landscape is somewhat bewildering for prosecutors:
although many of these cases begin with the child making an honest disclosure
to a mandatory reporter, “the most reliable hearsay evidence is the least likely
to be admitted, because structured interviews that are captured on videotape
are most likely to be deemed testimonial.”229
Finally, even if the child does testify at trial, the defense may try to impeach
the child witness, a task which will be made easier if the child discloses the

for a three-year-old’s disclosure to her parents shortly after the child was sexually abused on a bus to be
admitted as evidence under the excited utterance exception); People v. Duhs, 947 N.E.2d 617, 618 (N.Y.
2011) (holding that a three-year-old’s disclosure to a pediatrician that his mother’s boyfriend would not
let the victim out of a tub of “scalding hot water” was not testimonial and could come into evidence in
the doctor’s testimony under the medical diagnosis and treatment exception).
226 The prosecution may still be able to bring in the testimonial hearsay only if it can prove
that the child witness is unavailable and that the defense had a “prior opportunity” for crossexamination. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-56; accord DEBORAH JONES MERRITT & RIC SIMMONS,
LEARNING EVIDENCE 732 (4th ed. 2018). In practice, the latter requirement makes it very diﬃcult
for the government to admit testimonial hearsay in this way, particularly when an MDT or CAC
has been used. See MERRITT & SIMMONS, supra, at 754-55 (“As a practical matter, the requirement
of prior cross-examination excludes most testimonial hearsay—unless the declarant also appears at
trial to testify.”); Myrna Raeder, Remember the Ladies and the Children Too: Crawford’s Impact on
Domestic Violence and Child Abuse Cases, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 311, 381-83 (2005) (“[S]tatements made
to multidisciplinary teams will not be admitted unless the child testiﬁes.”).
227 Raeder, supra note 226, at 383. Scholars have reached diﬀerent conclusions regarding
Crawford’s eﬀect on practice. Compare id. at 311 (“Crawford’s testimonial approach has had a dramatic
impact on domestic violence and child abuse cases.”), with Cross & Whitcomb, supra note 215, at 21
(arguing that the full impact of Crawford is “not entirely clear” because research has largely focused
on case law and not on actual prosecutorial practice).
228 See Thomas D. Lyon & Julia A. Dente, Child Witnesses and the Confrontation Clause, 102 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1181, 1189 (2012) (“Crawford has changed the nature of the cases that
prosecutors choose to pursue, rendering its full eﬀects invisible to readers of the appellate reports.”).
229 Id. at 1190.
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abuse in stages or to a source found to be supportive of the child, or if the victim
has recanted.230 In general, jurors are less likely to find children credible.231
b. The Uncooperative Caregiver
The decision about whether a child victim will testify can easily be
outcome determinative for the prosecution.232 To pursue a criminal case, it is
important for the prosecutor to maintain some relationship with the victim
for basic reasons, such as scheduling interviews and trial, as well as more
complicated ones, such as oﬀering reassurance that the district attorney is
validating the victim’s desire for justice.233 In the case of a child victim, this
requires the cooperation of the victim’s current caregiver. Following the
defendant’s arrest and arraignment, the criminal court will usually enter an
order of protection against the defendant to stay away from the child victim;
if the defendant is the child’s parent or PLR, the child will be removed from
the allegedly abusive adult’s care pending resolution of the case.234
As the case progresses, the child’s nonoffending caregiver may refuse to
cooperate with the prosecutor, leading to problems that may cause the case’s

230 See People v. Jones, 714 N.Y.S.2d 876, 879 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct., Kings Cnty. 2000) (explaining
that the defendant retains the ability to cross-examine the child witness with respect to the manner in
which the police interviewed the child and the possibility of “nefarious motives”); Raeder, supra note
226, at 375 (“The fact that children disclose in stages also increases the likelihood of inconsistencies in
the child’s testimony. . . . Thus, the testimony of young children is viewed more skeptically by jurors
than that of adults because of concerns over suggestibility, manipulation, coaching, or confusing fact
with fantasy.”). Additionally, an abuse of the discovery process by defense attorneys may “revictimiz[e]”
the child. See Claire Chiamulera, Representing Child Abuse Victims: Criminal Court Strategies, AM. BAR
ASS’N (June 5, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_interest/child_law/resources/videos/
representing-child-abuse-victims--criminal-court-strategies [https://perma.cc/N5S8-PHSE].
231 See WHITCOMB, supra note 162, at 26 (concluding that child witnesses are generally
considered less credible, except in cases of sexual assault or when the child witness is “confident” in
her testimony, in which case the child witness is perceived as more credible than adults); Raeder, supra
note 226, at 375 (citing Myrna S. Raeder, Navigating Between Scylla and Charybdis: Ohio’s Efforts to
Protect Children Without Eviscerating the Rights of Criminal Defendants—Evidentiary Considerations and
the Rebirth of Confrontation Clause Analysis in Child Abuse Cases, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 43 (1994)).
232 See supra subsection II.B.1.a (explaining the central importance of the child victim’s testimony).
233 Courtney Fisher, What Matters: An Analysis of Victim Satisfaction in a Procedural Justice
Framework 1 (2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maryland, College Park),
https://drum.lib.umd.edu/bitstream/handle/1903/16403/Fisher_umd_0117E_15875.pdf?sequence=1&
isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/B23G-WQDP] (“[W]ithout the victim believing in the system—or
at least believing that the system is legitimate—the victim will not be motivated to begin or to
continue with the process that is needed for the American criminal justice process to work.”).
234 See Tinker, supra note 212, at 60 n.15 (“The defense attorney will not interview the child, in
most cases, until cross-examination at trial, since the allegedly abused child is generally removed from
the custody of the abusive adult and protected by a court order of protection.”); see also Obtaining An
Order of Protection, N.Y. STATE UNIFIED CT. SYS., https://www.nycourts.gov/faq/
orderofprotection.shtml [https://perma.cc/V7WR-TPD7] (last updated Jan. 4, 2019) (“In a criminal
case, the district attorney requests an order of protection for the victim or complaining witness.”).
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demise.235 Although uncooperative caregivers in child abuses cases are rare,
they continue to perplex prosecutors and should be of considerable concern to
a society that values child welfare.236 As a foundational matter, it is important
to recognize, as so many critics of CPS overenforcement do, parents’ broad
rights in this area. As Justice Sandra Day O’Connor explained: “[T]he interest
of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children . . . is perhaps the
oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by [the U.S. Supreme]
Court.”237 Indeed, a long line of Supreme Court precedent has repeatedly
affirmed parents’ Fourteenth Amendment rights in the “care, custody, and
control” of their children.238 In New York, parents retain rights over their
children when their children are under investigation in child delinquency
proceedings. As the Court of Appeals has explained: “[T]he parent of the child
has the right to attend the child’s interrogation by the police officer, and should
not be discouraged, directly or indirectly, from doing so.”239 As a general rule,
then, parents have important and enforceable rights over their children’s
liberty, including when their children become involved in the criminal justice
system. Relatedly, the uncooperative parent is likely to be successful in
influencing the child victim, not only because of the amount of time the two
spend together outside of any official monitoring, but also because the child is
“afraid of hurting or displeasing the parent.”240
Why would a nonoffending parent refuse to cooperate? When the
defendant is the nonoffending parent’s intimate partner, the answer appears
intuitive to some prosecutors: the nonoffending parent is choosing to protect
that partner at the expense of the child.241 These situations are extremely

235 See supra note 233 and accompanying text (discussing the need for cooperation from the
child that is provided through the child’s caregiver).
236 See STEPHANIE D. BLOCK & LINDA M. WILLIAMS, THE PROSECUTION OF CHILD
SEXUAL ABUSE: A PARTNERSHIP TO IMPROVE OUTCOMES 22 (2019) (concluding that obtaining
the support of nonoﬀending parents in criminal prosecutions remains a challenge for the ﬁeld);
Cross & Whitcomb, supra note 215, at 23 (identifying “children’s caregivers not supporting
prosecuting” as one reason why prosecutors decline to pursue child maltreatment cases nationally).
237 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
238 See id. at 65-66 (listing prior cases that aﬃrm parents’ rights in these areas).
239 See In re Jimmy D., 938 N.E.2d 970, 973 (N.Y. 2010) (referencing “statutory and commonlaw principles” concerning parents’ rights as the basis for the decision); accord N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT
§ 305.2(1)–(3) (McKinney 2020) (requiring the police to notify the child’s parent or PLR of the
child’s arrest if the child is younger than sixteen years old).
240 Cf. Tinker, supra note 212, at 62. Tinker is writing in the context of a situation in which the
defendant is an abusive parent, but the same set of loyalties also exist between the child and the
uncooperative parent who is not a defendant.
241 See BLOCK & WILLIAMS, supra note 236, at 21-22 (explaining that some cases do not move
forward because the “[parent] seemed to defend a perpetrating partner, boyfriend, or girlfriend
instead of protecting their child”); LINDA C. FENTIMAN, BLAMING MOTHERS: AMERICAN LAW
AND THE RISKS TO CHILDREN’S HEALTH 180 (2017) (“Frequently, prosecutors portray mothers
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difficult for the prosecutor to navigate, and can easily trigger CPS involvement
against the nonoffending parent.242 Action by CPS may be justified and
necessary; by refusing to cooperate with law enforcement, the nonoffending
parent risks allowing the abuse to repeat itself.243 This explanation, though
prevalent in popular culture,244 is too simplistic. In general, family cases are
difficult to prosecute: relationships between parties in a criminal case are the
primary driver of so-called “case attrition” across different felony crime
categories.245 Specifically as it relates to child abuse, the argument is deeply
gendered because these cases disproportionately involve a mother’s boyfriend
as the defendant.246 As Professor Linda C. Fentiman demonstrates, the idea
of a mother shielding her child’s batterer may oversimplify the picture by
disregarding the fact that the mother has often been subjected to the
defendant’s violence as well.247 Indeed, we know from the domestic violence
who have not prevented harm to their children as having deliberately put their relationship with a
lover . . . above their maternal obligations.”).
242 BLOCK & WILLIAMS, supra note 236, at 21-22.
243 Cf. FENTIMAN, supra note 241, at 180 (2017) (arguing that there are some instances in which
“women who fail to protect their children from the violent acts of their partners” should be
prosecuted after a fact-intensive examination of the reasons for the mother’s behavior).
244 See, e.g., Associated Press, Children at Higher Risk in Nontraditional Homes, NBC NEWS (Nov. 18,
2007 12:16 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/children-higher-risk-nontraditional-homesflna1C9464008 [https://perma.cc/KM7V-XEKX] (“[M]any scholars and social workers who monitor
America’s families see the abusive-boyfriend syndrome as part of a broader, deeply worrisome trend.”).
245 MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 147, at 147 (quotation marks omitted). Miller and Wright
rely on a signiﬁcant study from the Vera Institute for Justice, which reported in 1981 that
criminal conduct is often the explosive spillover from ruptured personal relations
among neighbors, friends and former spouses. Cases in which the victim and
defendant were known to each other constituted 83% of rape arrests, 69% of assault
arrests, 36% of robbery arrests, and 39% of burglary arrests. The reluctance of the
complainants in these cases to pursue prosecution (often because they were reconciled
with the defendants or in some cases because they feared the defendants) accounted
for a larger proportion of the high rate of dismissal than any other factor. . . . [T]here
can be no doubt that the relatively close defendant-victim relationship is responsible
for much of the case deterioration in court.
VERA INST. OF JUST., FELONY ARRESTS: THEIR PROSECUTION AND DISPOSITION IN NEW
YORK CITY’S COURTS 135 (rev. ed. 1981).
246 See FENTIMAN, supra note 241, at 184 (“Single women living with their children experience
violence from their partners at a rate more than ten times that of married women with children.”)
(footnote omitted); Leslie Margolin, Child Abuse By Mothers’ Boyfriends: Why the Overrepresentation?,
16 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 541, 545, 549 (1992) (concluding that child abuse is more likely in
single-parent homes, showing that most of that abuse is carried out by the mother’s boyfriend, and
stating that potential causes for this elevated risk of abuse include generic factors such as elevated
rates of abuse among nonparent caregivers and patterns of male abuse as well as speciﬁc factors like
the lack of a genetic connection to the abused child).
247 See FENTIMAN, supra note 241, at 180 (“Family violence encompasses both child abuse and
intimate partner violence . . . the two are frequently connected because abusive men use violence—
and the threat of future violence—against women and their children to control the women.”).
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context that the victim (or here, the uncooperative mother) often fears
retaliation or a loss of economic support.248 Similarly, if domestic violence has
led the mother to court in the past, she may be reluctant to return to a system
that is too often unsupportive of victims.249 These considerations may make
her decision not to cooperate seem much more pragmatic.
But above all else, it may be uncertainty that acts as the real barrier to justice
here. Looking beyond the explanations just explored, confusion about the
nature of parallel enforcement may also explain non-cooperation. When
parents are involved with the child welfare or criminal justice system, their
greatest concern is frequently child custody.250 For example, Professor Tina
Lee, who conducted ethnographic field research in New York City’s family
courts, documented that women who had experienced domestic violence often
feared reporting the abuse out of concern that they would “catch[] a case” with
CPS and risk child removal.251 In the minority communities that are policed
by both CPS and law enforcement, there is significant distrust with respect to
both systems,252 and noncooperating caregivers may have previously had
negative experiences with CPS or in criminal court. As demonstrated here,
concern that CPS and law enforcement work together to enhance penalties
against parents is not all misplaced. Indeed, criminologists who study victim
behavior identify “challenges related to criminal justice institutions and
personnel” as including “fear of secondary victimization, lack of awareness

248 See id. at 193 (identifying factors that prevent women from leaving their abusers). See
generally Angela Corsilles, Note, No-Drop Policies in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases: Guarantee
to Action or Dangerous Solution, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 853, 875 (1994) (“Prosecutors and advocates
often fear that the continued prosecution of some domestic violence cases will expose battered women
to retaliation from their batterers”). In situations of domestic violence coupled with child abuse,
women face a “complex calculus” in deciding whether to leave the relationship, including the risk that
leaving risks increasing violence toward her and her children. FENTIMAN, supra note 241, at 194.
249 See Deborah Epstein, Eﬀective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the Role of
Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3, 5 (1999) (“Incidents of domestic
violence typically trigger multiple civil and criminal cases, each with distinct and complicated intake
processes . . . . This fragmented process hopelessly confuses most victims, and few manage to ﬁle
for all the forms of complementary relief they need.”).
250 See supra notes 148–49 and accompanying text.
251 See Tina Lee, Child Welfare Practice in Domestic Violence Cases in New York City: Problems for
Poor Women of Color, WOMEN, GENDER, & FAMS. OF COLOR, Spring 2015, at 58, 71-73; see also
KARIN V. RHODES, CATHERINE CERULLI, CATHERINE L. KOTHARI, MELISSA E. DICHTER &
STEVE MARCUS, VICTIM PARTICIPATION IN INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE PROSECUTION:
IMPLICATIONS FOR SAFETY 104 (2011) (stating that a victim may decline to report domestic
violence because of fear of CPS involvement).
252 See FENTIMAN, supra note 241, at 195-96 (detailing why women of color are particularly
hesitant to report domestic abuse); see also Cliﬀord & Silver-Greenberg, supra note 23 (describing
the perception of “the criminalization of . . . parenting choices” among poor Black and Hispanic
women in New York City); Roberts, supra note 117, at 1491 (explaining that Black mothers bear the
brunt of law enforcement and CPS supervision of their parenting).
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about available resources, or other structural impediments.”253 The evidence
evaluated here suggests that a lack of certainty among nonoffending parents
about parallel enforcement—which might not even be perceived as parallel by
those it targets—may represent such a structural barrier to justice.
c. Pursuing Justice for Children
Even if the nonoﬀending caregiver is reluctant to cooperate with law
enforcement, the caregiver does not have a legal basis to veto the prosecution
of a crime against the child. First, cases of child abuse are distinct from, for
instance, certain New York “family oﬀenses,” in which the criminal court and
family court exercise concurrent jurisdiction over the matter and in which the
complainant may elect to proceed in either or both forums.254 In technical
terms, this is because EWC is not a family oﬀense and moreover, abuse
against a child cannot be classiﬁed as a family oﬀense if the alleged
perpetrator does not fall within one of the legally recognized categories
suﬃcient to constitute “family.”255
In addition, criminal prosecution vindicates an interest in the pursuit of
justice that is independent from the parent’s constitutionally recognized right
to control one’s child.256 Here, the extensive scholarship in the prosecution of
domestic violence cases—an area in which victim noncooperation is a major
problem—is instructive.257 Like victims of domestic violence, child abuse
victims “encounter[] increased barriers to participation,”258 particularly when
the nonoﬀending parent is the party actually or eﬀectively making the
decision on behalf of the child.
253 Leana A. Bouﬀard, Matt R. Nobles, Amanda Goodson, Kadee Brinser, Maria Koeppel,
Miner P. Marchbanks & Nandita Chaundhuri, Service Providers’ Knowledge and Perceptions of the Legal
Service Needs of Crime Victims, 42 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 589, 589-90 (2017) (internal citations omitted).
254 Crimes that can constitute “family offenses” include Harassment in the First or Second Degree,
Forcible Touching, and Assault in the Second or Third Degree. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 530.11(1)
(McKinney 2020); see also id. § 530.11(2)(h) (providing the complainant with a choice as to how to proceed).
255 See id. § 530.11(1) (deﬁning family members as those who are “related by consanguinity or
aﬃnity,” married to each other or were previously married, parents to the same child, or in an
intimate relationship, a designation which is at the discretion of the court); see also People v. Leonel
A., 610 N.Y.S.2d 451, 454 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct., New York Cnty. 1994) (explaining that the dismissal
of a criminal EWC case in favor of adjudication as an abuse and neglect matter in family court was
not permitted given the serious nature of the physical abuse allegations which “if proven, [would]
require additional sanctions unavailable to the Family Court”).
256 Cf. VERA INST. OF JUST., supra note 245, at 135 (explaining that while the collapse of cases
because of relationships between the parties “may be rational from the perspective of the decision
makers,” “it may not be rational or desirable in all cases” for the victim).
257 See People v. McMullan, 95 N.Y.S.3d 84, 85 (App. Div. 2019) (recognizing that admitting
“limited” information about a pattern of domestic violence to be helpful in explaining why a victim
did not call the police and could help “place the events in question in a believable context”). See
generally Corsilles, supra note 248, at 870-73 (discussing reasons for victim noncooperation).
258 Corsilles, supra note 248, at 870.
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At the same time, just like the mandatory prosecution of domestic
violence, the prosecution of serious child abuse, even in the face of parental
opposition, has the potential to “educate the public, change the conventional
assumption that battering is a private matter, and ultimately bring about
justice.”259 This concern about vindicating the rights of the child victim is
especially relevant in this context: while prosecuting domestic violence cases
over the objection of the victim may raise concerns about the victim’s
autonomy,260 the child does not even have the opportunity to express such an
opinion when the parent prevents the child from ever speaking to law
enforcement. The child may be trapped.
At least in cases involving child abuse by a stranger, child victims who do
not see their cases prosecuted “may feel that no one believed them, and they
may fear being victimized again.”261 Law enforcement has made signiﬁcant
strides when it comes to taking domestic violence seriously, and now must do
so with crimes against children by aggressively pursuing child abuse, even
over the nonoﬀending parent’s lack of cooperation or active interference.
Although prosecutors must remain alert to circumstances in which
prosecution may subject the child to more harm,262 they should not cease
prosecuting cases simply because a caregiver will not cooperate. As with the
prosecution of domestic violence, pursuing the case despite the
noncooperative parent’s lack of participation may ultimately empower the
victim (and her parent) and even encourage later cooperation.263 The
prosecutor must “tak[e] control of the criminal process” to signal that further
abuse of the victim or nonoﬀending parent will not allow the defendant to
skirt prosecution.264 Similarly, continued prosecution indicates to the

259 Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence
Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1908 (1996).
260 See id. at 1855 (discussing “tensions that underlie the question whether women ought to
have a right to choose not to prosecute their batterers”).
261 WHITCOMB, supra note 162, at 10.
262 See Jennice Vilhauer, Understanding the Victim: A Guide to Aid in the Prosecution of Domestic
Violence, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 953, 961 (2000) (footnote omitted) (“Because of the fact that,
unlike other crime victims, domestic abuse victims often remain in imminent danger of serious
physical harm from the perpetrator, victim safety must be the foremost concern.”).
263 Id.; Elizabeth Rush, Jodi A. Quas & Bradley D. McAuliﬀ, Child Witnesses’ Experiences of
Distress in Criminal Court: Sources, Consequences, and Solutions, in STRESS, TRAUMA, & WELLBEING
IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM 89, 91-95 (Monica K. Miller & Brian H. Borenstein eds., 2012) (surveying
the data on children’s testimony and concluding that when provided with the necessary support, the
experience of testifying “may allow[] them to feel that their voice has been heard” despite
momentary discomfort at trial); cf. MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 147, at 140 (explaining that a
mandatory prosecution policy in domestic violence cases “takes the victim ‘oﬀ the hook’ and
insulates her from pressure to drop the case coming from her partner, family, and friends”).
264 Vilhauer, supra note 262, at 961 (“[T]he prosecutor sends a clear message that the batterer
cannot use control over the victim to avoid criminal sanctions.”).
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uncooperative parent that there are greater societal interests at stake over
which the parent may not exercise a unilateral veto.265
2. Making Enforcement Parallel
After committing to prosecuting the case, prosecutors must often secure
the nonoffending parent’s cooperation to obtain the child victim’s testimony.266
To do this, the prosecutor can rely on several powerful tools such as out-ofhome surprise interviews,267 subpoenas,268 or CPS action.269 But while these
methods might more effectively force cooperation, they present some of the
same risks associated with the criminalization of CPS: they could separate the
child from an otherwise fit parent, which risks permanently alienating the
uncooperative parent, retraumatizing the victim and uncooperative parent,
and effectively punishing the victim for having made a disclosure of abuse.270
Therefore, less coercive methods are preferable under a child-centric
framework. For example, informing the nonoffending parent about the true
costs of child abuse may help alter the course of that parent’s support for the
child victim.271 Likewise, law enforcement can “play an important role in
responding to a victim’s concerns and needs for services, specifically by

265 Cf. MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 147, at 140 (explaining the mandatory prosecution laws
in the domestic violence context “emphasize that society at large has an interest” in preventing it).
266 See supra note 233 and accompanying text (explaining the nonoﬀending parent’s key role).
267 See PENCE & WILSON, supra note 20, at 19 (“Many investigators have had success
interviewing children at school . . . .”).
268 See MARY A. FINN, EFFECTS OF VICTIMS’ EXPERIENCES WITH PROSECUTORS ON
VICTIM EMPOWERMENT AND RE-OCCURRENCE OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 12 (2003)
(describing subpoenas as the “most coercive strategy that prosecutors may use” because ignoring a
subpoena can result in the issuance of an arrest warrant).
269 See BLOCK & WILLIAMS, supra note 236, at 20-21 (noting the increased likelihood of
prosecution when CPS has acted).
270 PENCE & WILSON, supra note 20, at 21 (explaining the nonoﬀending parents often fear law
enforcement after an investigation has been opened); cf. WHITCOMB, supra note 162, at 11 (stating
that removal from the home and placement into foster care after making an allegation of abuse “may
feel like punishment to the child”). See generally CTR. FOR IMPROVEMENT OF CHILD & FAM.
SERVS., PORTLAND STATE UNIV., REDUCING THE TRAUMA ON INVESTIGATION, REMOVAL, &
INITIAL OUT-OF-HOME PLACEMENT IN CHILD ABUSE CASES 10 (“The potential for children to
be traumatized during the process of investigation, removal and out-of-home placement is high, as
these processes often involve conﬂictual interactions between professionals and family members and
can evoke fear, resistance, and hostility.”).
271 See BLOCK & WILLIAMS, supra note 236, at 22 (emphasizing the need for “psychoeducational approaches” in dealing with nonoﬀending parents that stress the need to believe the
child); see also Julie A. Lipovsky, Cynthia Cupit Swenson, M. Elizabeth Ralston & Benjamin E.
Saunders, The Abuse Clarification Process in the Treatment of Intrafamilal Child Abuse, 22 CHILD ABUSE
& NEGLECT 729, 730 (1998) (“[F]or nonoﬀending family members, abuse-related causal beliefs
[about those abusive events] may aﬀect the expression of support of the child victim and the quality
of the child’s subsequent functioning.”).
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providing referrals to victim service agencies or other resources.”272 But
because uncertainty surrounding engagement with law enforcement and its
relationship to CPS can cause noncompliance, law enforcement ought to now
support the victim and nonoffending parent by clearly expressing and
formalizing the distinct roles played by the two systems.
Speciﬁcally, nonoﬀending caregivers need assurance that cooperation
with law enforcement in criminal matters involving their children will not
result in a collateral family court proceeding against them and subject them
to what many fear most: child removal. In concrete terms, such assurance
might take the form of a formalized agreement between the district attorney,
CPS, and nonoﬀending parent that no CPS or criminal action will be opened
against the parent for the underlying events that gave rise to the criminal
action against the defendant.
Such an agreement would be subject to several conditions. For one, both
CPS and law enforcement would need to determine that the parent is truly
nonoffending. Reaching this threshold determination would likely be the most
difficult part of such a plan because any agreement would need to be entered
into relatively early in the investigative process to avoid contaminating
evidence and infringing on speedy trial rights. Nevertheless, the relevant
agencies could draw upon existing, statutorily authorized tools such as the
MDT/CAC in order to make this decision with all relevant stakeholders. In
addition, the nonoffending parent would still be subject to civil or criminal
liability for other, unrelated accusations of child abuse or neglect. Accordingly,
the agreement would need to be specific as to the range of covered conduct.
Finally, the nonoffending parent would need to actually assist in the
investigation by granting the district attorney access to her child and
complying with any existing court orders, including the no-contact order
between the defendant and the child.273
This intervention is not radical but would nevertheless provide much
needed clarity to parents in highly stressful situations and who struggle to
make sense of the blurred lines between the family and criminal systems. A
formal agreement restricting a case to one court system is familiar to parallel
enforcers274 and should now be extended to family and criminal law. Likewise,
Bouﬀard et al., supra note 253, at 589-90.
See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Organization and Functions Manual § 27 (2012)
(acknowledging that although a case comes into the system as a criminal matter, “it may be
appropriate for the matter to include and/or be resolved through a civil, regulatory, or administrative
remedy”); PETER FINN & MARY O’BRIEN HYLTON, USING CIVIL REMEDIES FOR CRIMINAL
BEHAVIOR xi (1994) (“These jurisdictions have found that civil remedies can be easier to use than
criminal sanctions . . . because they often do not require victims to testify, can provide immediate
relief (for instance, through injunctions and restraining orders), and avoid the needs for a laborintensive criminal or civil trial.”).
272
273
274
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deferred prosecution, immunity, and cooperation agreements routinely seek
to clarify the terms upon which a witness will participate in a criminal
investigation.275 Additionally, this proposal is modest, insofar as it essentially
provides formality to what should be the status quo: the nonoffending
caregiver will not be punished for the abusive actions of another. But the
agreement would not be inconsequential. On one hand, it brings the stakes of
noncooperation out into the open for the parent, confirming that
noncooperation risks civil and criminal sanctions. On the other hand, and
more importantly, it provides a nonoffending parent with a more definite
picture of what one can expect from the legal system, alleviating the
uncertainty that often accompanies victimization.276
Beyond the reassurance for the child victim and the caregiver, this
proposal would also yield systemic beneﬁts for law enforcement. An
additional, more ﬁnely calibrated tool for obtaining or shoring up caregiver
support may allow prosecutors to overcome the institutional “inertia” that has
thus far allowed uncooperative parents to obstruct prosecutions.277
Furthermore, even if the use of formal agreements fails to yield immediate
results in terms of gaining caregiver cooperation, the proposal to shift many
cases to family court would free up resources for assistant district attorneys
to pursue more resource-intensive techniques, such as evidence-based
prosecution,278 which do not require the child victim’s participation.
III. PARALLEL ENFORCEMENT REDUX
This Comment proposes two targeted interventions into a confused
parallel enforcement dynamic that has collapsed into a single powerful
enforcement regime. As a result of overenforcement, caregivers living in
poverty too often ﬁnd themselves subjected to dual Article 10 and EWC
275 These actions represent the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in practice. See, e.g., AM.
BAR ASS’N, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-4.4(f) (2017)
(“The prosecutor should consider the possibility of a noncriminal disposition, formal or informal,
or a deferred prosecution or other diversionary disposition . . . .”); id. § 3-4.6(h) (discussing
immunity agreements); U.S. Dep’t of Just., supra note 25, § 9-27.600-630 (providing guidelines for
entering into non-prosecution agreements in exchange for cooperation).
276 Cf. Bouﬀard et al., supra note 253, at 589-90 (discussing the emotional challenges that
nonoﬀending parents face).
277 See Note, The Paradox of “Progressive Prosecution”, 132 HARV. L. REV. 748, 762 (2018)
(explaining that line prosecutors might not be as motivated to pursue reform as aggressively as their
supervisors); Rachel Louise Snyder, Opinion, We Prosecute Murder Without the Victim’s Help. Why Not
Domestic Violence?, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/04/opinion/
sunday/domestic-violence-recanting-crawford.html [https://perma.cc/94JZ-ZR85] (“Authorities in
many jurisdictions still believe that without victim cooperation, there’s no reason to prosecute.”).
278 Evidence-based prosecution is a practice in which a prosecutor attempts to prove the case
with evidence other than the victim’s testimony at trial. See generally Snyder, supra note 277 (tracing
the development of evidence-based prosecution, including how it is used post-Crawford).
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proceedings on the basis of child neglect. Here, the logic of parallel
enforcement justiﬁes compounded sanctions, while in practice it blends
investigative and adjudicative functions in an environment with weak
procedural protections. At the same time, an uncooperative parent—who may
justiﬁably fear interaction with an enforcement regime that threatens
personal liberty and the parent-child relationship279—can deny the child
victim of abuse the opportunity to be heard. By shifting the neglect-only
cases back into their traditional domain of family court, and by more
aggressively pursuing cases of serious child abuse, New York will build a
necessary wall between the two systems. This better adheres to federal and
state law and represents a more balanced enforcement model capable of
replication in other jurisdictions.
A. Compliance with State and Federal Law
The proposed recalibration of enforcement priorities would better align New
York with state and federal law. First, an approach oriented toward the provision
of services through CPS would seek to prevent child neglect by tackling the root
problem of poverty. This strategy is in step with the current federal approach as
codified in the Family First Prevention Services Act.280 Even if that law does
not (and could not) go far enough toward addressing “all the ways that public
systems fail poor families,”281 ceasing the criminal prosecution of most povertyrelated neglect cases is a logical first step in “strengthen[ing] families before the
need for removal arises,” the law’s foremost goal.282
By disentangling CPS and law enforcement in this set of cases, the state
could more eﬀectively devote resources away from enforcement and toward
service delivery.283 Professor Douglas J. Besharov has described this dynamic
of overenforcement in the child welfare context as a case of “[t]oo [l]ittle and
[t]oo [m]uch,” in that “children in real danger of serious maltreatment get lost
279 See Besharov, supra note 93, at 559 (“[I]nvoluntary removal of the child or the oﬀending
adult from the home is always a possible consequence of intervention. . . . This is a paradigm of
coercive state intervention into family life.”).
280 See supra notes 189–91 and accompanying text (explaining how a renewed focus on services
is aligned with the Family First approach).
281 KRAMER, supra note 52, at 3; see id. (describing “homelessness, addiction, unemployment,
mental illness, domestic violence, and grinding, intergenerational poverty” as factors that lead
families to court); Villalpando, supra note 191, at 285-86 (2019) (summarizing concerns with the law,
particularly the twelve-month limitation on the provision of preventative services designed to solve
complex issues like addiction).
282 Villalpando, supra note 191, at 284-86.
283 CPS already faces significant resource limitations because of its legal requirement to investigate
all reports, even if a majority of them turn out of be unfounded. See Besharov, supra note 91, at 563 (“Forced
to allocate a substantial portion of their limited resources to these ‘unfounded’ reports, protective agencies
often are unable to respond promptly and effectively when children are in serious danger.”).
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in the press of the minor cases ﬂooding the system.”284 Since Besharov
provided that description in 1985, the problem of CPS overenforcement has
continued to grow, particularly through the “criminalization ” of child welfare,
including the state’s increased willingness to employ criminal sanctions
against parents.285 At the same time, CPS’ strengthened commitment to and
capacity for delivering preventative services allows CPS to intervene in
potential neglect cases earlier, preserving family unity by avoiding the
avenues that can lead to child removal and foster care.286
Second, shifting neglect cases primarily into CPS’ scope of authority
practically answers Vreeland’s criticism that criminalization runs counter to
state and federal requirements that the state make “reasonable efforts” at
keeping the family intact.287 Formally, the reasonable efforts analysis is limited
to the family court context, but as Vreeland convincingly shows, a more robust
analysis considers the obvious impact that a criminal neglect prosecution will
have on the family.288 The proposal here goes even further than Vreeland’s by
calling for a more pronounced separation between the two systems. It also
broadens the conception of child welfare by actually calling for increased
prosecution in more severe cases. This focus on serious cases of child abuse
would bring prosecutorial practice in line with the purpose of New York’s
criminal law, which promises “[t]o provide for an appropriate public response
to particular offenses, including consideration of the consequences of the
offense for the victim, including the victim’s family, and the community.”289
Even more fundamentally, the systematic recalibration proposed here
“differentiate[s] on reasonable grounds between serious and minor offenses”
through the imposition of “proportionate penalties.”290
Finally, this pair of proposals would bring executive action in the child
welfare space into line with the dictates of the Court of Appeals’ ruling in
Nicholson. In that case, the court examined the Family Court Act’s legislative
history and concluded that “a blanket presumption favoring removal was
never intended.”291 In operationalizing the relevant standards, the court held
that the mere existence of a risk to the child was an insuﬃcient basis upon
Id. at 562.
See supra subsection II.A.2.
See supra note 201 and accompanying text (explaining how New York CPS is particularly
well equipped in the area of delivering preventative services).
287 See supra note 51 and accompanying text (describing this requirement in federal and state
law); Vreeland, supra note 156, at 1072.
288 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1039-B (McKinney 2020); Vreeland, supra note 156, at 1072, 1094.
289 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1.05(5) (McKinney 2020). Vreeland makes reference to this provision
of the Penal Law, but it appears that the author referred to a historical version of the statute or
another source entirely. See Vreeland, supra note 156, at 1072 n.171.
290 PENAL § 1.05(4).
291 Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 820 N.E.2d 840, 852 (N.Y. 2004).
284
285
286
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which the state could seek removal.292 Rather, the family court must
determine “whether the imminent risk to the child can be mitigated by
reasonable eﬀorts to avoid removal.”293 Here, the court emphasized the
availability of diﬀerent remedies, including orders of protection and victim
services, that could be used to reduce the risk to the child by “maintaining the
integrity of the family unit and instead remov[ing] the abuser.”294 The
proposal presented here aligns with Nicholson’s approach of balancing the dual
legal imperatives of protecting the child’s safety and respecting the integrity
of the family. In particular, the proposal seeks to increase the probability that
the child will not be removed from the caregiver most equipped to care for
the child. Critically, achieving this goal requires reform of both the family
and criminal law domains. The state should exercise enforcement discretion
in not pursuing otherwise ﬁt caregivers whose poverty led them to court, but
should aggressively seek to remove those who have actively harmed the child.
Adjusting how the government intervenes into family life could ﬁnally help
the safe home to become a reality for more of New York’s children.
B. Looking Beyond New York
The proposals outlined here can be used in other U.S. jurisdictions. In
2018, Jerry Milner, the Associate Commissioner of the Children’s Bureau,
compared the current American approach to child welfare to the government
buying ambulances, rather than airbags and seatbelts, to protect drivers; that
is to say, there is an emphasis on reacting to the problems of child abuse and
neglect rather than intervening early and preventing incidents from occurring
in the ﬁrst place.295 To bring about this paradigm shift, Milner emphasized
the “tremendous role” of the legal community in “jointly own[ing] the
outcomes that we are trying to achieve,” speciﬁcally by ensuring the
“wellbeing of families.”296 Indeed, New York’s enforcement imbalance in this
realm—with its negative consequences for children and families—reﬂects a
broader problem in the United States. Nevertheless, both the analytical frame

Id.
Id.
Id.
Nat’l Ctr. for State Cts., Imagine a New Child Welfare System, VIMEO (June 25, 2018),
https://vimeo.com/276889408 [https://perma.cc/SE7N-J7CZ].
296 See id. (stressing the need for preventative services in order to prevent ﬁrst-time incidents
of child maltreatment); accord David Kelly, Beyond the Table: The Need to Work with Courts and the
Legal Community to Improve Child Welfare Outcomes, CHILD.’S BUREAU EXPRESS (Dec. 2018/Jan.
2019), https://cbexpress.acf.hhs.gov/index.cfm?event=website.viewArticles&issueid=202&sectionid
=2&articleid=5249 [https://perma.cc/4UUG-ZZEN] (“It is in no one’s interest to remove children
unnecessarily or keep children and youth in care longer than absolutely necessary.”).
292
293
294
295
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and simple legal solutions oﬀered here represent meaningful ﬁrst steps in
moving toward a more family-centric, wellbeing-oriented model.
Although child welfare originated as and remains rooted in state law, the
trend toward the centralization of child welfare policy has made it increasingly
possible to identify systemic issues.297 In this vein, child abuse and neglect are
unmistakably national problems: in FFY 2018, there were 678,000 unique child
victims.298 1,738 of them died because of maltreatment.299 In responding to this
large number of cases, other states have ended up in the same enforcement
paradox as New York, overenforcing neglect provisions and underenforcing abuse
crimes. Between 1990 and 2017, rates of substantiated physical abuse declined by
40%, while rates of substantiated neglect fell by only 8%.300 During the same time
period, neglect cases as a proportion of total cases rose from 49% to 75%.301
In this context, overenforcement remains a consistent issue. While the federal
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act and subsequent legislation provide a
general, baseline definition of child abuse and neglect,302 states diverge widely in
defining the term.303 Some exclude elements of neglect that would appear to pose
the greatest harm to children, such as failing to provide medical care or proper
nutrition, while others include elements, such as supplying inadequate clothing,
in which preventative services or public assistance are likely to provide relatively
straightforward solutions.304 Similarly, the “thresholds for intervention” vary
297 See Sankaran, supra note 133, at 2-3 (explaining that the federal government “has sought to
create uniformity in how states administer child welfare systems” by tying federal funding to
minimum standards); KASIA O’NEILL MURRAY & SARAH GESIRIECH, A BRIEF LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM 1 (2004) (“[T]he federal government’s role in the
modern child welfare system has increased as federal funding augmentations are accompanied by
new rules and requirements emphasizing greater accountability on the part of states in achieving
positive child outcomes.”); JILL GOLDMAN, MARSHA K. SALUS, DEBORAH WOLCOTT & KRISTIE
Y. KENNEDY, A COORDINATED RESPONSE TO CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: THE
FOUNDATION FOR PRACTICE 51 (2003) (explaining that the Social Security Act created a “uniform
framework for administration” over existing state child welfare programs).
298 CHILD MALTREATMENT 2018, supra note 94, at 19 tbl.3-C.
299 Id. at 46.
300 Child Maltreatment, CHILD TRENDS (May 7, 2019), https://www.childtrends.org/
indicators/child-maltreatment [https://perma.cc/4V4E-DGQW].
301 Id.
302 See CAPTA Reauthorization Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-320, tit. I, § 142(a) (amending
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 93-247, § 3 (1974)) (codiﬁed at 42 U.S.C.
§ 5101 note) (“[T]he term ‘child abuse and neglect’ means, at a minimum, any recent act or failure
to act on the part of a parent or caretaker, which results in death, serious physical or emotional harm,
sexual abuse or exploitation . . . .”).
303 See Rebecca Rebbe, What Is Neglect? State Legal Definitions in the United States, 23 CHILD
MALTREATMENT 303, 305 (2018) (noting that states’ deﬁnitions of neglect reﬂect constituents’
speciﬁc concerns in light of ﬁscal constraints); see also CHILD.’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH
& HUM. SERVS., DEFINITIONS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 2-4 (2019) (surveying state laws
and noting the variation with respect to the types of behaviors that constitute child neglect).
304 See Rebbe, supra note 303, at 308 tbl.2.
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widely: whereas thirty-four states may take civil action in the face of threatened
harm alone, twenty-one apply a more holistic, “child-focused definition” when
deciding whether to intervene.305 Accordingly, both social workers and legal actors
may exercise various levels of discretion when making enforcement decisions.306
This discretion is heightened when these officials must make judgment calls
regarding statutory and regulatory language such as “adequate supervision,” which
demands the consideration of multiple context-specific factors.307 As in New York,
parents around the country enter into agreements with child protection agencies
during investigations,308 replicating the interventions that would otherwise be
possible only with some degree of judicial oversight.
Dual enforcement regimes are also common, as all states employ parallel
enforcement structures and provide for the criminal enforcement of child abuse

305 Id. at 308-10. A comparison across various states reflects different breadths of statutory definitions.
See id. at 309 fig.1 (depicting this diversity). Compare N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-2(G)(2) (2020) (defining a
neglected child as one “who is without proper parental care and control or subsistence, education, medical
or other care or control necessary for the child’s well-being because of the faults or habits of the child’s [PLR]
or the failure or refusal of the [PLR] when able to do so, to provide them”), and MD. CODE ANN., FAM.
LAW § 5-701(s) (LexisNexis 2020) (“‘Neglect’ means the leaving of a child unattended or other failure to
give proper care and attention to a child by any parent or [PLR] under circumstances that indicate: (1) that
the child’s health or welfare is harmed or placed at substantial risk of harm; or (2) mental injury to the child
or a substantial risk of mental injury.”), with KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2202(t) (2019) (defining neglect as “acts
or omissions by a parent, guardian or [PLR] resulting in harm to a child, or presenting a likelihood of harm,
and the acts or omissions are not due solely to the lack of financial means of the child’s parents or other
custodian”), and VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 4912(1) (2020) (providing one combined definition of “abused or
neglected” child as including “a child whose physical health, psychological growth and development, or
welfare is harmed or is at substantial risk of harm by the acts or omissions of his or her parent or other
[PLR]”), with OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.03(A)(6) (LexisNexis 2020) (defining a neglected child as one
“[w]ho, because of the omission of the child’s [PLR] suffers physical or mental injury that harms or threatens
to harm the child’s health or welfare”), and N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-02(14)(a) (2020) (defining a
neglected child as one “without proper care or control, subsistence, education as required by law, or other
care or control necessary for the child’s physical, mental, or emotional health, or morals, and is not due
primarily to the lack of financial means of [the PLR]”). There is limited data available as to the effect of
variance in statutory definitions and the inclusion of new elements in neglect statutes on child safety
outcomes. See INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 355-56.
306 Rebbe, supra note 301, at 310-11.
307 CHILD.’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., LEAVING YOUR CHILD
HOME ALONE 2 (2018) (“States do not provide any detail on what is considered ‘adequate
supervision’ . . . [F]actors . . . such as the child’s age, mental ability, and physical condition; the length
of the parent’s absence; and the home environment [are considered in evaluating supervision].”); see
also N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. C.V., No. A-2940-17T4, 2019 WL 1300518, at *2 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 20, 2019) (collecting cases and stating that appellate courts have looked to
“the child’s age and the duration of the lack of adult supervision,” as well as, critically, the parent’s
culpability); Ghosh v. Ill. Dep’t of Child. & Fam. Servs., No. 13-1099, 2014 WL 2730725, at *9 (Ill. App.
Ct. June 13, 2014) (noting that regulations instruct the Department of Children and Family Services to
evaluate fifteen different factors in determining whether a parent exercised inadequate supervision).
308 See INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 59 (“In many child
protection cases . . . no formal legal process is even initiated; the family agrees to a voluntary service
plan that is overseen by the state.”); see also Brown, supra note 44 (criticizing this practice).
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and neglect.309 The trend in New York toward criminalization as a product of
cooperation between CPS and law enforcement reflects a broader, national
development.310 There are different models of CPS–law enforcement
cooperation across the country.311 While some basic practices such as the
sharing of child abuse and neglect reports are universal, some jurisdictions
engage in more extensive strategies of interagency cooperation.312 Florida’s
system, for example, goes even further than New York’s in explicitly mixing the
functions of CPS and law enforcement, with Florida police officers conducting
over a quarter of child abuse and neglect investigations.313 Predictably, the
problems associated with CPS overenforcement plague many communities
across the United States, creating fault lines between the communities at the
receiving end of child welfare enforcement and the state.314 By more
consciously moving neglect cases into the exclusive domain of CPS, CPS and
law enforcement could more clearly define relationships to the communities
they work in by reducing unnecessary child removals and criminal convictions.

309 CHILD.’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., WHAT IS CHILD WELFARE?
A GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 1 (2018) (“Each State has requirements for when and how law
enforcement and child welfare should interact.”); GOLDMAN ET AL., supra note 297, at 55 (noting the
participation of “civil and criminal” courts at the state level); id. at 56 (outlining behaviors that rise
to the level of criminality in most jurisdictions, including “[c]riminal neglect and abandonment”).
310 Professor Roberts summarized the state of aﬀairs in 2002:

Many cases fall within the scope of general criminal statutes, such as those punishing
assaults, homicides, sexual assaults, and incest. Many states have also passed special criminal
child abuse and neglect statutes. In most states, child welfare agencies notify police about
the most serious cases of abuse. But police are increasingly arresting parents even for minor
instances of neglect that traditionally had been handled by child protective services.
ROBERTS, supra note 81, at 77; see also David Finkelhor & Richard Ormrod, Child Abuse Reported to
the Police, JUV. JUST. BULL., May 2001, at 2, 7 (noting an increase in police involvement in child
abuse and neglect cases nationwide).
311 See CASEY FAM. PROGRAMS, SUPPORTIVE COMMUNITIES 2-3 (2018), https://caseyfamilyprowpengine.netdna-ssl.com/media/SComm_Models_Law_Enforcement_fnl.pdf [https://perma.cc/TP7PZC9P] (outlining three different categories of collaboration models as “[m]inimal law enforcement
involvement or coordination[,]” “[j]oint collaborative child abuse and neglect investigations[,]” and
“[s]ole law enforcement investigation responsibility”).
312 See id. at 4-6 (describing the interagency strategies used in seven states).
313 See id. at 6; Finkelhor & Ormrod, supra note 310, at 7 (explaining that the transfer of authority
in Florida represented a break from the traditional division of functions between the agencies).
314 See Diane Redleaf, After the Hotline Call, ATLANTIC (Jan. 27, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/
ideas/archive/2019/01/problem-child-protective-services/580771 [https://perma.cc/EX7N-TDSD] (“Threats
of family separation, coupled with restrictions on families’ living arrangements during CPS investigations,
are commonplace in a number of states, including Illinois.”); cf. ROBERTS, supra note 81, at 94 (explaining
how overenforcement targets Black communities with high levels of childhood poverty); see also Dorothy E.
Roberts, The Racial Geography of Child Welfare: Toward a New Research Paradigm, 87 CHILD WELFARE 125,
125, 133 (2008) (evaluating interviews with African American women in Chicago and concluding that “[k]ey
social effects of the concentration of DCFS [CPS] supervision included: interference with parental
authority, damage to children’s ability to form social relationships, and distrust among neighbors”).
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At the same time, underenforcement is also a national problem. Physical
abuse is almost always a crime, commonly a misdemeanor.315 Prosecutors
around the country find child abuse difficult to prosecute, especially because of
the unavailability of evidence and the developmental inability of some child
victims to testify.316 While states have expanded the formal rights of crime
victims in general,317 state constitutional and statutory guarantees fail to
account for the unique needs of child victims,318 whose rights remain “weak.”319
Furthermore, U.S. Supreme Court decisions like Crawford320 and those

315 See INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 35 (noting an exception in
some physical abuse statutes for certain types of corporal punishments). Compare CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 53-21(a)(1) (2020) (deﬁning the crime as “willfully or unlawfully caus[ing] or permit[ting]
any child under the age of sixteen years to be placed in such a situation that the life or limb of such
child is endangered, the health of such child is likely to be injured or the morals of such child are
likely to be impaired, or does any act likely to impair the health or morals of any such child”), with
18 PA. CONSOL. STAT. § 4304(a)(1) (2017) (“A [PLR] of a child under 18 years of age, or a person
that employs or supervises such a person, commits an oﬀense if he knowingly endangers the welfare
of the child by violating a duty of care, protection or support.”).
316 See generally Cross & Whitcomb, supra note 215, at 22-23 (ranking the prevalence of reported
challenges based on a national survey of prosecutors).
317 See RICHARD G. SINGER & KENNETH WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE II: FROM BAIL
TO JAIL 438 (4th ed. 2018) (“By the late twentieth century, individual victims of crimes had increasingly
won the right to participate in the criminal process. No longer limited to being ‘witnesses for the
prosecution,’ victims are now acknowledged by many state constitutions and statutes . . . .”) (footnote
omitted). For a substantive and procedural critique of a recently passed “victim’s rights” constitutional
amendment in Pennsylvania, see Elizabeth Randol, Why Pennsylvanians Should Vote “No” on Marsy’s Law,
AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION OF PA. (Oct. 24, 2019, 2:45 PM), https://www.aclupa.org/en/news/whypennsylvanians-should-vote-no-marsys-law [https://perma.cc/W3HZ-JKVE].
318 See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28 (providing no special protections to child victims its
Victim’s Bill of Rights); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 142A-2 (2020) (same in the statutory context).
Speciﬁc references to young victims serve to allow parents or PLRs to assert the rights guaranteed
to adult victims. E.g., N.C. CONST. art. I § 37(1b) (“[I]f the victim is a minor . . . a family member,
guardian, or legal custodian may assert the rights provided in this section.”); S.D. CONST. art. VI,
§ 29, ¶ 19 cl. 4 (similar). These clauses, of course, are of little use if a parent or PLR is unwilling to
assert these expanded rights on behalf of his child. Exceptionally, Washington State does have a
speciﬁc and comprehensive statute addressing the needs of child victims and witnesses; however,
“the enumeration of [these] rights shall not be construed to create substantive rights and duties, and
the application of an enumerated right in an individual case is subject to the discretion of the law
enforcement agency, prosecutor, or judge.” WASH. REV. CODE § 7.69A.030 (ﬂush language) (2020).
319 See Chiamulera, supra note 230 (quoting a lawyer who advocates for the “very proactive”
representation of child victims).
320 E.g., State v. Arnold, 933 N.E.2d 775, 784 (Ohio 2010) (concluding that Crawford applies
when the statements obtained by a CAC social worker “related primarily to the state’s forensic
investigation[,]” rather than “for medical diagnosis or treatment” of the victim); State v. Pitt, 147 P.3d
940, 944 (Or. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that statements made by child victims to a CAC director are
“undebatably [sic] ‘testimonial’” for Crawford purposes); see State v. Blue, 717 N.W. 558, 563-64 (N.D.
2006) (collecting cases from various jurisdictions and describing the applicability of Crawford as the
majority position); see also Cross & Whitcomb, supra note 215, at 25-26 (explaining reported views on
Crawford’s impact on the prevalence of charging cases, having child victims testify, and obtaining
convictions). But see id. at 21 (expressing a more ambivalent view about Crawford’s overall impact).
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enshrining the rights of parents321 are federal law and pose a difficulty for
prosecutors seeking to pursue cases with child witnesses who are unavailable to
testify, either because of their developmental state or because of the actions of
their caregivers. Given the close relationship between CPS and law
enforcement across the country, it is plausible that fear of working with law
enforcement as a result of an unclear division of authority between the two
agencies is a barrier to successful prosecution outside of New York, too. As such,
formally expressing the difference between the systems could be a constructive
first step in increasing the willingness of uncooperative caregivers to assist in
the prosecution of more serious cases of child abuse. In sum, nationalizing the
model proposed here would allow CPS and law enforcement agencies across
the country to specialize in what they do best, an important step toward
rebuilding or reaffirming trust in the institutions that are vitally important for
the protection of our society’s vulnerable—children and families.
CONCLUSION
Applying the framework of parallel enforcement to the relationship
between local CPS and law enforcement in New York illuminates the complex
relationship between the two agencies. Parallel enforcement proves to be a
malleable legal tool, simultaneously justifying the existence of systems capable
of investigating and sanctioning the same conduct, while also frequently
bringing the two together in order to enhance the efficacy of both. As this
Comment has shown, though, efficacy is not necessarily an admirable goal,
especially when resources are misallocated toward pursuing cases of child
neglect, in which prevention services and prospective assistance are likely to
be most effective in fulfilling the legal requirement to prioritize family unity.
At the same time, caregivers whose children have been victims of serious
abuse currently exercise too much power in criminal investigations. This
Comment challenges the idea that noncooperation is a byproduct of bad
intentions or poor parenting, and instead suggests that fear bred by an
understandable lack of clarity about the two institutions is a hurdle to
developing a productive relationship with nonoﬀending caregivers. As
preliminary steps toward resolving this enforcement paradox, I recommend
shifting more cases of poverty-related neglect out of the criminal system and
providing nonoﬀending caregivers with legal clarity in the cases of child
abuse. Taken together, these recommendations could help to keep violent
abusers away from children and enable families to use social services, care for
their children, and remain uniﬁed.

321

See supra notes 237–38 and accompanying text (discussing the recognition of strong parental rights).

